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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND 
CHIGI'S CAREER TO 1870 
The year 1870 was either an annee terrible or an annus 
mirabilis for a good portion of Europe, depending on whether one's 
country was the recipient of blessing or disaster. The multitide of 
writing on the events of that year will never cease, nor will the polit-
ical effects still to be seen in contemporary Europe. Discussion will 
long endure of the contradictions of a liberal empire, a disputed can-
didacy, the editing of a dispatch, the mechanized invasion across the 
Rhine~ the violent birth of a republic with a monarchist assembly, 
the awkward proclaiming of an absolute empire, an infallible pope 
without a country, and the verve of Roma Capitale. 
Few could have been in a better position to be familiar with 
I" 
these events than Flavia Chigi (1810-1885), titular Archbishop of 
Mira and Apostolic Nuncio to Paris. As a key figure in the Paris 
diplomatic world, chief spokesman for a worried pope before the 
pontiff's protector, negotiator with the Iron Chancellor, and a fellow 
traveler with a lost and uncertain provisional government, Chigi had 
an excellent locus from which to observe the unfolding of a very 
\ 
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complex and multi-faceted drama. "Observe'' is the correct word 
as Chigi 's direct influence in the story of 1870 was mini.ma!, Rather 
his role was one which put him officially and unofficially into close 
contact with many elements and which makes him worthy of study. 
Archbishop Chigi was as signed to Paris fro:n January of 1862 
through May of 1874. The years 1870 and 1871 were the busiest of 
Chigi 1s remarkably long tenure. Only brief attention need be pa id 
to Chigi's early career, the decade of the 18.60's, or to the post-war 
years. The main focus of this work will be the crucial twenty months 
from January, 1870 to the end of August, 1871, that is, from the 
start of Ollivier's ministry to the resignation of Favre and the ai-
firmation of Thie rs as President of the French Republic, 
The duties of an apostolic nuncio, reflecting the duality of the 
nineteenth century papacy, wer~ twofold: the head of the Roman 
Cathol~c Church then represented a spiritual domain and a temporal 
one. The spiritual area was the pope's leadership of a world-wide 
religion which had a very self-assured opinion of itself and its mis -
r 
sion. The temporal sphere, after 1860~ was a portion of the middle 
segment of the Italian peninsula where Pius IX retained sovereignty 
with the aid of Napoleon III's troops. It was the era of the thorny 
Roman Question. 
The papal diplomatic agents could not escape this duality any 
more than the popes could. The duties and missions of nuncios 
\ 
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involved both the spiritual life of the Catholic Church within the bord-
ers of the country to which they we re accredited and the pol i.tical 
relations between two sovereignties. On the spiritual side, the ma in 
function of a nuncio was to act as official intermediary i.n the naming 
of bishops of dioceses within the •1ation. There were variations 
among European states on how this was done. Other "spiritual" 
functions included forwarding letters of citizens to the Holy Father, 
transmitting petitions of canonization, repor.ting personnel changes 
among the important clergy, alerting the Vatican on potentially here-
ti.cal seminary professors and printed material, advising on the ap-
pearance of new cults, and collecting and dispatching the Peter's 
Pence. 
On the temporal or political side, a nuncio's duties corres-
ponded to those of most regular' an: bas sadors: dealing with the 
foreign minister on mutual matters, conveying news of foreign events 
gained through diplomatic channels, reporting on internal political 
developments, handling complaints of citizens, and maintaining a con-
r 
stant attention to the attitude of the host country.:..toward the home 
1 government. 
1
vatican diplomatic terminology differs from the civil nomen-
clature. A "nuncio" is a full-ranked ambassador from the pope to a 
country with which the Vatican has full diplomatic relations, A nun-
cio is not to be confused with an "apostolic delegate 11 which indicates 
a Vatican representative to the Catholic Church within a country with 
\ 
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In his years at Paris, Flavio Chigi's activities covered all 
those duties. But his was no ordinary ambassadorial position, com -
plicated as it was by the all-pervasive Roman Question. Because of 
the overriding importance of the Roman Question, attention is given 
herein to the 'political-diplomatic" aspects of Ch.igi 1s term, Little 
will be said about the ··spiritual" side though much could be done in 
this regard as the Vatican documents are very full. 
Since Chigi was at Paris for a full tw~lve years, any attempt 
to deal fully with such a complex period as 1862 through 1874 would 
involve a longer study than a dissertation requires. The historical 
literature for Franco-Vatican relations during Louis Napoleon 1s reign 
is virtually endless. Works of all styles and prejudices can be found 
in a number of languages. The early 1870 1s and beyond are less 
covered than the previous epoch, largely due to the fact that until the 
time of the Ralliement the story lacks earnestness or substantial 
changes. Some literature does exist if only in a relatively small 
quantity. 2 
which the Holy See does not have diplomatic relations. An apostolic 
delegate does not normally deal with a civil government. A papal 
"legate" is a personal emissary of the pope who is given full powers 
of action in the area of his assignment as if he were the pope him-
self. A nuncio has far less power than a legate. Papal legates 
have seldom been used since the time of the Reformation. 
2The principle works on Franco-Vatican relations in this 
period are: Jean Maura in, La Politique Ecclesiatique du Second Em-
\ 
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It is the turnover period of the war years of 1870 and 1871 
which remain the least investigated. In order to show how a diplo-
matic agent worked in difficult and extraordinary circumstances and 
to show how Vatican-French relations evolved in a ti.me when the 
situation was so drastically altered for both governments, the narra-
tion will emphasize the critical years 1870 and 1871. 
Such a stated purpose does not rule out a glance over Flavio 
Chigi 's early career or the 1862 -1869 pe rio<;l. It should be remem -
bered that the following is intended to be a glance and little more. 
The intent is to show how the Vatican documents reflect the period 
and how Chigi reacted to important crises. The limited number of 
French sources cited bring out the official government view of the 
sometimes troublesome nuncio. 
Flavio Chigi was born in Rome on May 31, 1810, a scion of 
aristocratic Roman stock. His father was Agostino Chigi-Albani, 
Empire, de"l852 a 1869 (Pari.s, 1930); Lynn M. Case, Franco-Ital-
ian Relations, 1860-1865; the Roman Question and the Convention of 
Sept ember (Philadelphia, 1932); S. William Halperin, Italy and the 
Vatican at War. A Study of Their Relations from the Outbreak of the 
Franco-Prussian War to the Death of Pius IX (Chicago, 1939); E. E. 
Y. Hales, Pio Nono: A Study in European Politics and Religion i:: 
the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1957); Lili.an Parker Wallace, 
The Papacy and European Diplomacy, 1869-78 (Chapel Hill, 1947); 
Evelyn Acomb, The French Laic Laws (New York, 1941); and Roger 
Aubert, Le Ponti.Heat de Pie IX (Paris, 1952). 
All of these works, with the exception of Maura in, mention 
Chigi only in passing or not at all. 
\ 
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while his mother was Amelia Carlotta Barberini. With this mixture 
of Chigi, Albani, and Barberini, more noble blood could hardly be 
found in Rome. There had been four cardinals in the Chigi line, one 
of whom was Fabio Chigi (1599-1667) who had served as papal nuncio 
in France in the seventeenth century to the court of Louis XIV where 
he struggled with the Sun King, Mazarin, and Jansenism. Th.is Fabio 
Chigi was elected Pope Alexander VII in 1655. The Albani and the 
Barberini likewise claimed several cardinals and one pope each, 
Clement XI and Urban VIII respectively. 3 
In 1836, Flavia Chigi entered the Pontifical Nobel Guard, the 
military unit which served as a ceremonial bodyguard for the pope 
and was open only to sons of Roman noble families. Several French 
and Italian sources indicate that during this stage of his life, Chigi 
followed a very worldly course ~nd was one of the noted revellers of 
' 4 
Roma~ society. 
3 
Most of this biographical information is gained from: Dic-
tionnaire d 'Histoire et de G~ographie Eccl~siastique (Paris, 1953), 
Vol. 12, p. 685; from an obituary in La Civilta_:Cattolica, February 
23, 1885, pp. 613-614, Vol IX della serie duodecima (Vol. 141 in 
/ 
total series); and "Chigi, Flavia" entry in La Grande Encyclopedie: 
Inventaire Raisonne des Science, des Lettres, et des Arts (Paris, 
1886-1902), Vol. XI, p. 26. 
4 
Raffaele de Cesare, Roma e lo Stato del papa dal ritorno di 
Pio IX al XX settembre (Roma, 1907)- -English translation The Last 
Days of Papal Rome (London, 1909), p. 324 and resume on Chigi, 
Archives du Ministre des Affaires Etrang~res, Mlmoires et Docu-
ments, Rome, Vol. 109, fols. 16-17. The French Foreign Ministry 
\ 
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In 1849, Chigi. left Rome and went to Gaeta to join his self-
exiled pontiff, Pi.us IX, who had gone there to escape the Garibaldian 
uprising in the Eternal City. At some point in this sojourn, for 
reasons unclear, Flavio decided to embrace an ecclesiastical career. 
An official French report drawn up years later indicated that he ex-
pressed this desire to none other than Pius IX himself who urged 
Chigi along. 5 
Chigi took up seminary studies in Tivoli, northeast of Rome, 
and was ordained within a few years at the age of 42. His rise in the 
Vatican ranks was quick. In 1853, he was named a Canon of St. 
Peter's. In 1855 he became a domestic prelate with the rank of 
Secret Chamberlain on Active Duty to the Person of the Holy Father. 
The following year, at age 46, Chigi was consecrated Titular Arch-
bishop of Mira in partibus and ~,ras sent immediately as Nuncio Extra-
ordinary to represent Pius IX at the coronation of Czar Alexander II 
of Russia. Upon his return from St. Petersburg, Chigi was appoint-
ed Apostoli.£ Nuncio to Bavaria. He served at Muni.ch until hi.s 
appointment to Paris in late 1861. 
Archives are hereinafter cited as AMAE. This resume is from a 
collection drawn up in 1877 on all members of the College of Car-
dinals in the eventuality of a papal election. Chi.gi had become a 
cardinal in 1874 and was living i.n Rome in 1877. 
5 AMAE, loc. cit. 
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Chigi 1s assignment to Paris was enshrouded in a controversy 
unrelated to himself. The previous nuncio, Archbishop Sacconi, had 
long ceased to be an effective diplomat in the eyes of the French 
court. As early as 1859, both Rome and Paris had agreed on replac-
ing him, and Pius IX promised to give Sacconi a Red Hat and with i.t 
automatic promotion and removal to Rome. The naming of Chi.gi was 
suggested by the French ambassador in Munich, Baron de Menneval. 
The Imperial government found the nomination acceptable, but the 
arrival of Chigi could not be effected until the next consistory. Not 
until September of 1861 was Sacconi raised to the cardinalate. Chigi's 
appointment was formally announced, and he arrived in Paris to as -
6 
sume his post in January of 1862. He was now 51 years old. 
The first official dispatch which Chigi sent to Rome was dated 
January 18, 1862. It simply i~formed Secretary of State Giacomo 
Cardinal Antonelli (1806-1876) that the journey from Rome by way of 
Marseilles and Lyons had been successful and that ecclesiastical 
receptions }iad been held at a number of stops. Although Chigi. had 
been in Paris less than a week, he had already met with Cardinal 
Morlot (Archbishop of Paris), the Foreign Minister Edouard-Antoine 
Thouvenel, and a number of French politicians. For the next several 
days, the new nuncio was greeted by other members of the Paris 
6Maurain, p. 437. 
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Diplomatic Corps of which he was now dean. 7 
These first meetings rendered Chigi great satisfaction, He 
found from discussion with the Spanish and Austrian ambassadors that 
they thought that the stability of the Kingdom of Italy was limited, 
that things could not remain as they were in the peninsula, but that 
there was room for direct contacts between Victor Emmanuel and 
Pius IX. The diplomats also felt that there should be some reform in 
papal government whereby the pope should delegate his civil powers 
to laymen while leaving himself freer to be a spiritual ruler. 8 
The members of the Senate and Legislative Assembly, Chigi 
wrote to Antonelli, were men "worthy of faith. 11 Many speeches they 
gave reiterated the necessity of the Temporal Power and how "inad-
missable were the prententions Piedmont on Rome. 11 In every case, 
7 Archivio Segreto VaticanQ, Inventario della Segre ta ria di 
Stato, Rubricella #287 (1862). A rubricella is a day book in which 
we re recorded capsule summaries of all dispatches as they arrived 
from the vai-ious nunciatures. Use of these day books has proved 
largely sufficient for this first chapter. 
The Vatican Archives are cited hereinafter as ASV, the Sec-
retary of State's section as Segr di St. 
~ 
8 Rapporto #15, Feb. 9, 1862, ASV, Segr di St, Anno 1862, 
Rubrica 165, fascolo 21, fol. 80. A rapporto is an official di.spatch 
from a nuncio to the s-cretary of state in Rome. Citation of 
Chigh 's rapporti forms the bulk of Vatican documents used in this 
work. Chigi wrote a total of 2131 dispatches during his twelve years 
at Paris. 
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such sentiments reflected the thinking and polity of the Emperor him -
9 
self. 
Thouvenel was more cautious, indicating that although the 
Emperor had a desire to put an end to the present state of affairs in 
Italy and as devoted as the Emperor was to the Holy Father, there 
was a need for reconciliation between the interests of Italy and those 
of the Holy See. The annexations by Piedmont must be regarded as 
faits accomplis, and it was useless to think that France would resort 
to force to regain Papal territory already lost. Chigi drew some 
hope from Thouvenel's promise, given at the end of the interview, 
10 
that the French troops would not leave Rome. 
The first meeting between Chigi. and the Emperor was set for 
January 23 at the Tuileries. The occasion was the presentation of 
credentials, and it was much played up by Napoleon. The full court 
was pr,esent as well as most of the Diplomatic Corps. The Emperor 
gave the new nuncio a special guard of honor and the use of a carriage 
91bid., fols. 77-78. Important to note here is Chigiis refer-
ence to "Piedmont'' rather than "Italy. 11 Si.nee the Holy See did not 
officially recognize the existence of the Kingdom of Italy until 192 9, 
almost all of its official reference during.the nineteenth century to 
the major political state in the Italian peninsula was in terms of 
"Piedmont" or (until 1870) 11the government of Florence .. , Thi.s 
careful distinction was scrupulously adhered to by Chigi., as is seen 
throughout this work. 
lOibid., fols. 78-79. 
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from the Imperial stables. 
In presenting his credentials, Archbishop Chigi alluded to the 
honor he felt in being named to this "noble and generous nation'' 
which has proven itself to be "very Christian. 11 He hoped that he 
would employ all his zeal "to maintain the good rapport which happily 
exists between the Holy See and the French government. 11 In his 
reply, Napoleon said he had no doubts that Chigi's appointment would 
improve relations between himself and Rome and ''would serve the 
well-being of Religion and the peace of Christianity. " 
After this exchange, Chigi was accorded the privilege of being 
presented to Empress Eugenie who had waited in her own apartments 
during the official ceremonies. All in all, Chigi wrote to Antonelli, 
there certainly seemed to be a great deal of support, both official 
11 
and popular, for the cause of tlfe B:oly Father. 
On February 3, 1862, Chigi was a dinner guest of the Emperor. 
Afterwards, Napoleon and the nuncio had a discussion on matters 
pertinent to,.. the Roman Question. Napoleon again indicated how grate -
11 Le Moniteur Universal, January 24, 1862, p. 99, for the 
description of the presentation ceremony. Chigi's remark about the 
extent of support in France for the cause of the Holy Father is from 
ASV, Se gr di St, Rubricella #287 ( 1862). 
On the average, Chigi met with Napoleon III about twice a 
year. These meetings were in addition to the annual formality of 
the New Year's greetings from the Diplomatic Corps which Chigi 
delivered in his capacity as dean. 
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ful he was to the Holy Father for having appointed a nuncio and for 
thus having normalized relations between Paris and Rome. One day 
he hoped to see the present disputes in Italy settled. Matters were 
going in a vicious circle in the peninsula, and such things as the con -
tinual rebellion in Naples and Sicily would lead one to think that Italian 
unity was a "chimera." The activities of both the left-wing Gari-
baldians and the plots of the deposed conservative King of Naples 
lthen residing in Rome under Pius IX's protectioill showed how dif-
ficult Napoleon 1s situation was as he found both solutions inimical, 12 
If disorder and violence were to continue in Italy, the Em-
peror continued, France had a firm intention of searching for a means 
of aiding the Holy Father, but she would have to be obliged to exclude 
every project which would have the use of force as a base. Italy 
# 
must suffer for her own good. "It is not so bad that the Italians 
undergo this experience in their alleged greatness. Their misfortune 
displeases me, but I hope that it will be salutary, for such is always 
the better means to avoid self-deceit. Let us wait a while longer, 
and events will justify me," Napoleon concluded the conversation 
with another affirmation that French troops would not retreat from 
13 Rome. 
12Rapp 15, February 9, 1862, ASV, Segr di St, A 1862, R 
165, fols. 81-82. 
13Ibid., fols. 83-84. 
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S 1.ich was to be the style of most of Chigi 1s reports in the 
years 1862 to 1869: attention to all nuances of the Roman Question, 
whether in the Diplomatic Corps, the government and cabinet, the 
French press and literature, the episcopate, or the Emperor himself. 
Any embassy or nunciature serves its home government as a 
listening post to report events and evaluate policies of various nations. 
The Paris nunciature under Flavio Chigi was to be no exception. 
Chigi's dispatches from the first seven years were constantly filled 
with as much information as he could gather on significant diplomatic 
issues even if they were not of direct interest to the Vatican. 
For example, in 1863 Chigi furnished considerable background 
on the Polish uprising. The Catholic religion of the Poles concerned 
Rome, and Paris was a major source for data and developments. 
Chigi continually adjudged the shuation and imparted all details of 
negotiations of the powers over the affair. Discussion of Polish 
matters entered into many of the conversations Chigi held with Thou-
venel that y~ar. Chigi sought to keep the Holy See's views and posi-
tion known to the powers by direct contact with the various am bas -
sadors. _ The Vatican displayed this attention, not only because of 
the Catholicism of the Poles, but also because of an underlying fear 
that any diplomatic arrangements France might make elsewhere on 
the continent would undermine the strength of the French commitment 
14 
in Rorne. 
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In 1864 a similar pattern of behavior emerged regarding the 
Danish War. Once again, Chi.gi. filled the di.plomati.c pouches to 
Rome with note after note on the north European conflict, The Vati.-
can's concern here would seem more tenuous than in the Poli.sh case, 
yet one Catholic power (Austria) was involved and another Catholic 
power (France) was at close range, wondering whether to intervene. 
France 1s foreign policy was almost as important to the Holy See as 
15 its own. 
The Napoleonic intervention in Mexico also interested Chi.gi.. 
He reported on the selection of Maximilian of ~ustria as Emperor, 
his vi.sit to Paris and departure for Mexico, the di.ffi.culty between 
France and the United States, and the subsequent French disengage -
ment from the area. Church-State relations i.n Mexico were i.n a 
condition of tumult at the time, and Chigi. formed his part of the link 
of i.nformati.on to Rome. The nuncio even met wi.th the Empress 
Carlota in 4-ugust of 1866 when she came through Paris on her unsuc -
cessful journey of European capitals. Chigi was of little help to 
16 
her. 
14ASV, Segr di St, Rubricella # 294 (1863). 
15 ASV, Segr di St, Rubri.cella # 301 (1864). 
16ASV, Segr di St, Rubri.cella # 287 (1862), # 294 (1863), 
# 301 (1864), # 308 (1865), and# 315 (1866). 
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The events of the 1860's which did directly concern the Vatican 
and its efforts to retain the Temporal Power we re the September Con-
vention, the 1866 war between Austria and Prussia, and the 1867 
invasion of the Papal States by the Garibaldians. 
The September Convention of 1864 appeared as a complete sur-
prise to Chigi, as it did to many. The agreement calling for evacua-
tion of French troops from Rome while supposedly leaving the inde -
pendence of the Papal States under the protection of the Kingdom of 
Italy was another aspect of Napoleon III's secret diplomacy. Chigi's 
first dispatch on the pact did not go to Rome until after the announce -
ment, and there is no indication of any previous knowledge on Chigi 's 
part of the negotiations leading to the pact. From late September to 
the end of 1864, Chigi met repeatedly with the Foreign Minister 
Edmond Drouyn de Lhuys and wlth the Spanish, Austrian, and Prus -
sian ambassadors. His intent was to find the exact French position. 
He tried to pry information out of the Italian ambassador in Paris, 
ConstantinorNigra, with whom he rarely dealt, all to no avail. The 
final weapon was a direct appeal to the Emperor. This came in early 
November, 1864. Chigi met with both Napoleon and the clerical Em-
press Eugenie, but he described this session as "useless. 1117 
The 1866 war brought out the worst of nightmares to the 
17 ASV, Se gr di St, Rubricella # 301 ( 1864). 
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Vatican due to the defeat of Catholic Austria, the cession of VenP.ti.a 
to Italy, and the uncertainty as to whether France would enter the 
conflict. Chigi. conducted himself as he had done in the Dani.sh War 
two years earlier. He kept a close watch on all developments and 
dutifully reported them to Rome. His main pre-occupation was, as 
before, to ascertain where the French stood. 
Because the September Convention was now in force (it had 
been agreed on two years earlier and there was no French expedi-
ti.onary force at Rome while Italy was at war) and because the Vatican 
was diametrically opposed to the smallest changes in the Italian pen-
insula, much less at the expense of Austria, the cession of Veneti.a 
through French hands was a deeply felt blow. Chi.gi was upset at the 
French role despite the fact that Drouyn de Lhuys had made assur-
ances of the 11si.ncere neutrali.tf" of France. The French move was 
. 
taken as a double act of betrayal- -to Austria and to the Papacy, 
Chigi was pleased to report that Vienna resisted all suggestions to 
d h T . 18 ce e t e rentlno. 
r 
The 1867 invasion of the Papal States by Garibaldi brought the 
Roman Question out into the open more than it had been since the 
wars of Italian Unification. On his own, Garibaldi led a military 
force of volunteers from !tali.an soil across the papal frontier to 
18 
ASV, Segr di. St, Rubricella # 315 (1866). 
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liberate Rome but was stopped by a combined French and Papal army 
at Mentana. Chigi hardly had to furnish Rome with information in 
this particular event. He did give what advanced knowledge he had 
o~ the formation of the Garibaldi.an forces. Because of fears of action 
by these radicals, Chigi. was prompted as early as April of 1867 to 
request a renewed guarantee of the Temporal Power from the French. 
During the actual days of the crisis {October and November, 1867), 
Chi.gi. held several conferences with Drouyn de Lhuys and two with 
Napoleon III. The results were much better than what had been ob-
tained after the September Convention and Austro-Prussian War as a 
French army garrison remained permanently at Rome after the battle 
19 
of Mentana. 
The years 1868 and 1869 were relatively quiet ones for Chigi. 
No great international outbreakt loomed, no qualifications of French 
policy towards Rome seemed i.n the offing, the tenor of Europe was 
largely peaceful. Chigi 1s attention was for the most part turned to-
ward internal French politics and the preparations for the upcoming 
r 
ecumenical council. 
French archival sources are rather sparse on Flavio Chigi. 
No current personnel reports exist in the French Foreign Ministry 
Archives, no year-by-year file or resumes were kept, The archives 
l 9 ASV, Seg dr St, Rubricella # 322 (186 7). 
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of the Ministry of Cults are somewhat more ample but still limited in 
quantity. The official French view of the nuncio seems to have been 
one of some forebearance interspersed with periodic irritation as on 
several significant occasions in the 1860 1s Chigi acted beyond the 
limits of his capacity as ambassador in the opinion of the government. 
These several occasions involved times when Chigi communicated 
directly with French bishops and diocesan officials much to the dis -
tress of the French cabinet. 
In the spring of 1864, the bishop of Nice, Monsignor Sola, was 
entangled in a conflict with his cathedral chapter of canons. Prior 
to 1861, Nice had been a part of the Kingdom of Piedmont, but after 
France abs orbed the city that year, the diocese was in a state which 
had a concordat with Rome. Sola wanted to dismiss some members 
of the chapter who were politic~lly opposed to him, and he did so, 
claiming that' their appointments were illegal according to the Con-
cordat of 1801 because they had not been formally approved by the 
20 
French government. 
r 
Underlying this was the fact that Sola had previously enjoyed 
good standing with the government of Piedmont which was now the 
20Maurain, pp. 699-702. This narration is largely taken 
from Maurain. This author saw some of the same documents 
Maura in did in the Archives Nationales in Paris and at the AM.AE. 
Certain documents beyond those which Maura in used are cited ac -
cordingly. 
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perfidious state of Italy in the Vatican's eyes. The canons had been 
thrust. upon Sola by an angry Holy See, and he used the pretext of the 
lack of government sanction to dislodge the obstreperous cle ri.cs. 
The French government supported the bishop while the canons ap-
pealed to Rome. 
At this juncture, Chigi entered the fray and incurred reproach 
from the French cabinet. On May 19, 1864, Chigi addressed a letter 
to the canons saying that the pope had ordered him to inform them 
that the pontiff had heard their plea. Chigi further said, ·"His Holl -
ness encourages the capitulatory corps to hold firm in order that the 
present statute not be changed except with the agreement of the proper 
authority." Chigi hoped that the canons would find encouragement in 
21 
hearing these thoughts of the Holy Father. 
French ire was arousedlbecause of the definite stand taken by 
the Holy See and because the nuncio had been the transmitter of the 
note. According to the government's position, Chigi. had erred 
notoriously,.and gravely. Paris considered it an uncalled-for inter-
vention in internal affairs by a foreign agent, and the reaction of the 
21 The letter in its entirety is found i.n a note from Baroche to 
Drouyn de Lhuys, July 12, 1864, Archives Nati.onales, Fonds du Min-
i.st~re des Cults et Justice, Fl 9 1924. The italicization of the words 
"to hold firm" is in the Ba roche note, and the re is no indica ti.on 
whether the emphasis was made by Baroche or was in Chi.gi.'s ori.gi.naL 
Portions of the letter are also reproduced in Maurain, p, 700, 
Archives Nationales hereafter cited as AN. 
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cabinet was swift. The Minister of Cults and Justice, Pierre-Jules 
Baroche, fired a note o_f protest to the Quai d'Orsay in which he suc-
cintly stated a phrase which would be repeated often, "Le nonce 
n 'est qu 'un ambassadeur. 11 Baroche cited earlier instances when 
previous nuncios had to be reminded of this (notably 1802, 1823, 
1852) and both the nuncio and the Holy See had reneged. 22 
The French ambassador in Rome, the Comte de Sartiges, 
carried a note of protest to Cardinal AntoneUi. Antonelli replied by 
defending the right of the pope to use nuncios to communicate with 
the clergy, otherwise there would be little use to having nuncios at 
European courts. The normal procedure was for a nuncio to send a 
copy of such correspondence to the government beforehand. Anton-
elli merely expressed regret that such an action had not occurred in 
this particular instance. 
, 
The Nice affair was basically centered in this exchange of 
notes and other actions from May to August of 1864, capped by 
Antonelli 's )lalf-apology and admission of irregularity. The Quai 
d'Orsay and the Ministry of Cults continued for the next several 
months to keep a close eye on events at Nice and on Chigi. The con-
frontation did not set an ideal mood for the coming of the September 
22 
Baroche to Drouyn de Lhuys, AN, loc. cit. 
23 Convention that same year. 
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Only a few more months elapsed when Chigi. committed another 
error of judgment in the matter of corresponding with the French 
Episcopat. In the wake of the encyclical Quanta Cura of December 8, 
1864 and the famous appended Syllabus Errorum, the reaction of the 
French clergy produced some forthright statements. Two of the 
more renowned ones were issued by the bishop of Poi.tiers, Louis 
Pie, who defended the encyclical in a widely·:.publici.zed sermon, and 
the bishop of Orleans, Felix Dupanloup, who skillfully interpreted 
the Syllabus in a manner which toned down the conservative views of 
Pius IX. Chigi created strife similar to the Nice affair by writing 
letters of congratulation to both of these prelates early in 1865, 
These letters were published by Le Monde in early February, prob-
, 
ably through no fault of Chigi 's. 
, In his letter to Pie (January 12, 1865), Chigi indicated that 
he had received "with joy" Pie's pulpit statement. He further wrote, 
"The verit~le glory of the Church of France would be resplendent 
without shadow on this occasion. . . . It would be such a consolation 
23AMAE, Memoires et Documents, Rome, Vol. 117, sub-
titled "Immixtion des nonces dans les affaires ecclesiastiques de 
France, 1864," contains over 200 pages of notes and documents on 
the Nice controversy. A complete analysis of these papers is un-
necessary here because of space limitations and because of the 
adequate treatment to be found in Maura in. 
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to the Holy Father how this Catholic Nation would be inspired in its 
courage and firmness from which, despite diverse opinions which 
may appear, it does not waver. 11 
Writing to Dupanloup on January 26, Chigi was hardly less 
complimentary. In referring to Dupanloup's pamphlet as a 1'magni-
ficent work, 11 Chigi wrote, 11I cannot finish without expressing to you 
all my recognition for this new testimony in whi.ch you have given the 
Church and the Holy See of your zeal and devotion and for the power-
ful backing which you bring forth again, so helpful to the cause of the 
24 
Holy Father. 11 
The text and tone of these letters, supporting as they did two 
bishops who had been so outspoken in an area of controversy of acute 
embarrassment to the civil power, represented for the French gov:.. 
' ernment another instance in which the nuncio interfered in France's 
interna1 affairs. Baroche noted, as he had earlier in the Nice case, 
that the published letters ''constituted an infraction of the rules of 
internationa! law and the public right of France. 1125 
Sartiges was ordered to lodge another protest. Antonelli had 
little choice in the matter other than to order a full apology by Chigi. 
Chigi was given an audience by Napoleon III on February 14, 1865 at 
24 Undated memo from Baroche quoting the letters, AN, 
F 19 1924. 
25Ibid. 
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which he expressed atonement for the publicity and assured the Em -
peror that "penetrated with the duties of his diplomatic standing, he 
never had any intention of straying from the rules of international 
law. 11 The Moniteur simply noted that the Emperor accepted the 
26 
apology "with benevolence. " 
An undated memo emanating from the Ministry of Cults about 
this time stated much of the French position on the place and bounds 
of a nuncio. The memo largely refers to Chigi 's practice of writing 
to bishops notifying them of transfer. Beyond scorning this parti-
cular device as being contrary to the principles of international la\t;, 
the memo further stated, 11 ••• the Emperor and his Government 
have never admitted and cannot admit that the Nuncio of the Holy 
26 Le Moniteur, Februat-y 15, 1865, p. 145 and Maurain, 
pp. 720-22. Chigi, of course, did correspond with the French 
episcopate on occasions other than the Nice affair and the Syllabus 
letters. Examples of his correspondence can be found in the fol-
lowing: papers of Cardinal Donnet, Archbishop of Bourdeaux, AN, 
160 AP, d. 3; Bishop Dupanloup's papers, AN, AB XIX 526, d. l; 
M. Lagran_ge, Vie de Mgr. Dupanloup, eveque d 10rleans (Paris, 
1883-84), Vol. II, pp. 471-473; M. Paguelle de Folenay, Vie du 
Cardinal Guibert (Paris, 1896}, Vol. II, p. 347; and Louis Baunard, 
Histoire du Cardinal Pie (Paris, 1886), Vol. II, p. 224. 
In light of the fact of the existence of these and presumably 
other letters of Chigi to French bishops, the irritation by the 
French government in 1864 and 1865 is difficult to understand. 
Evidently, it was the publicity which prompted the o·~trage of the 
cabinet. 
At the Vatican Archives, the author was informed that the 
whereabouts of Chigi 1s personal papers (other than the official cor-
respondence with Antonelli} is unknown. 
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Father may correspond directly with bishops. This principle has 
... been explicitly recognized by the court of Rome on numerous 
occasions, some of them very recent." The note went on to say that 
in writing to bishops, the nuncio committed acts of ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction which had always been forbidden for a nuncio to do in 
France. "It is here again that the Government of the Emperor is 
obliged to put forth an absolute protest at this pretension. 11 
Further along, referring again to the· "pretensions of the 
Nunciature, 11 the memo said that Rome and the Nuncio should re-
member a decree from an earlier pope (Urban VIII} that in cases of 
transferred bishops, only the Roman Curia or ''some other means'' 
should be used to send such a notice. The French government had 
historically been "the other means" by which all papal correspond-
ence had been transmitted. Tht! memo concluded that the government 
should declare again that it would no longer tolerate direct corres-
' 
pondence between the Nuncio and the bishops. 27 
There were to be several more instances of Chigi's conduct 
r 
before 1870 which would compromise him in front of the cabinet. In 
1866, he wrote to the cathedral chapters of Marseilles and Vannes, 
instructing them to proceed with a canonical election upon the resig-
27AN, F 19 1947. The memo is in a subsection of this carton 
entitled: ''Rapports de la France avec Rome sous le Second Empire 
et la T rois i~me Republi.que. 11 
-25-
nation of the previous ordinary. In 1863 and 1867, the Minister of 
Cults turned down requests by provincial bi.shops that Chi.gi. be allowed 
to participate in local religious observances. Baroche deni.ed the 
requests, indicating that the nuncio could not be allowed to attend such 
functions where his mere presence and seniority would allow him to 
28 
preside over the services. 
In early 1869, the French government took exception to letters 
of some Ultramontane clergy in France on tne upcoming council which 
' were published in Rome in the Jesuit organ, Ci.vilta Cattolica. The 
government thought the publication improper since the letters had 
passed through the Paris nunci.ature. The French were further dis -
turbed by the pro-infallibility nature of the letters. Chigi castigated 
29 
the government for itself interfering in the Holy See's matters. 
, 
Drouyn de Lhuys was prompted at one point to remark to 
Baroche that although Rome was always disposed to admit "in pri.n-
ciple 1 ' that the nuncio accredited in France 'was only an ambassa-
dor, " the ¥atican always evaded the issue when a question of a 
30 
violation came up. 
2 9Maurain, pp. 896-899. 
30 19 Drouyn de Lhuys to Baroche, February 15, 1966, F 1924. 
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All this did little to make relations between the Second Em-
pire and the Holy See harmonious. It is well-established that such 
things as the September Convention, the S_yllabus, the mistrust be -
tween Pius IX and Napoleon III, the Emperor's chameleon views on 
the Roman Question, and the Ultramontane-Liberal split in the ranks 
of French Catholics were definite signs of Franco-Vatican discord. 
It is safe to say that the conduct of the papal nuncio in Paris during 
the same period was of no help and probably" did more harm than 
good. 
As the decade of the 1860 1s closed, the Vatican Council opened. 
In France, some of the Emperor's "liberal" reforms were imminent. 
The immediate prospects for understanding between Paris and Rome 
were dim, Only a few more months remained in which to re-estab-
I 
lish cordiality before the skies would collapse in the summer of 1870, 
CHAPTER II 
IN THE LAST DAYS OF THE SECOND EMPIRE 
JANUARY TO JULY, 1870 
The last six months of the life of the Second Empire are often 
described as its last spring. Internal economic growth was never 
greater, the social issues were dormant, the liberal reforms began 
to take hold, the foreign scene boded peace. The Papacy was enjoy-
ing similar strength despite the discord often seen in the sessions of 
the ecumenical council. Pius IX was popular as never before, there 
was an overwhelming infallibilist majority in the council, the Tern-
" poral Power was secure with the continued presence of French troops 
and the seeming weakness of Italy, and the rush toward the proclam -
ation of infallibility was itself a sign of ultimate triumph. The 
iss.ues and ~uties which faced Flavia Chigi from January to July of 
1870 reflected this optimistic outlook, as he shared in the successes 
experienced by Paris and Rome. With the exception of an abortive 
French attempt to intervene in the council, the situation was encour-
aging. 
The year 1870 opened with the annual New Year's reception 
at the Tuileries in which the Diplomatic Corps took part. Chigi, as 
-27-
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Dean of the Corps, delivered the official greeting to Napoleon III as he 
had done each January I since 1863. In his remarks, Chigi gave the 
traditional New Year's message of the assembled corps, making 
particular reference to the ambassadors' hopes for the health of the 
Emperor, Empress, and Prince Imperial and for the prosperity of 
France. Napoleon's formal response indicated his hope for good re la -
tions between hi.s government and foreign powers in the new year. 1 
The Emperor made a personal aside to Chigi, entrusting him 
to pass on to the Holy Father his profound homage. Napoleon regret-
ted that his own state of ill-health and the work of the council facing 
the Pope had prevented the two from maintaining better contact. The 
Prince Imperial likewise approached Chigi at the reception and re -
quested that the nuncio lay before the Holy Father his peaceful wishes 
d d . 2 an evotion. 
The next day saw the announcement of the new Ollivier Minis -
try, the so-called cabinet of the 2nd of January. The new ministry 
1Journal Offi.ciel, January 2, 1870, p. 5. 
2 Rapp 1527, January 4, 1870, ASV, Segr di St. Archi.vi.o di 
Nunziatura di. Pari.gi (hereafter ANP). This report was found in 
the archives of the nunciature now on file at the Vatican. The files 
of the various nunciatures are systematically recalled to Rome, 
Unfortunately, these particular bundles of documents are not pagi-
nated as the R ubrice are. Reports not found in the Secretary of 
State 1 s file can usually be found in rough draft in the nuncia tu re a r-
ch i.ves. 
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was to embody the latest step of Napoleon III's continuing libe raliza -
ti on as it was intended to be a true, functioning cabinet. Chigi saw 
in the formation of this new ministry the intent and hope of the Em -
peror to establish. a "vital 11 government, one balanced betwee::1 Center 
and Center -Right which would enhance the imperial authority and one 
which would create a counterbalance against the Orleanists and other 
elements. Chigi thought that all political elements which could pre -
vail against such a combination as the Ollivier cabinet were all in 
motion but that such a design of opposition would not have any proba -
bility of succeeding. 
The men to be found in the ministry were very acceptable to 
Chigi. Louis Buffet at Finances, Lou vet in Agriculture and Com -
merce, the Marquis de Thalouet at Public Works, rand the new Presi-
.,. 
dent of the Conseil d 'Etat, Marie-Louis Parieu, all n~d reputations 
as fervent and practicing Catholics. The Comte Daru, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, and Emile Segris, Minister of Public Instruction, 
were "decisively infused for the cause of the Church." Two other 
members of the ministry, Emile Ollivier, Keeper of the Seals, and 
Maurice Richard, Minister of Fine Arts, were Protestants but Chigi 
thought them well-disposed toward the Catholic religion. "It is 
false to assume," Chigiwrote to Antonelli, "that Ollivier is so 
ravished with errors concerning the two most important points, the 
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Temporal Power and the rapport between Church and State. 113 
Antonelli 's reaction was that Chigi 's report, along with other 
information about these men he had received from France and else -
where, 11bad given hope that the interests of the Church and of the 
Temporal Power of the Holy Father will find in the new ministry a 
new means of support and •.. perhaps an effective defense. !I 
Antonelli. also told Chigi that the nunci.o 1s communication conformed 
to his own judgment of the men in power. Rome evidently felt re -
assured that Napoleon III's continued liberalization and appointing of 
non-Catholics to important positions did not appear to threaten French 
policy toward Rome. 4 
Chi.gi quickly learned to adapt himself to dealing \Vi.th the new 
liberal system. Antonelli had ordered him to seek an interview with 
Daru to obtain the 'Emperor's final agreement to some nominees to 
vacant sees. Chigi's first impulse was to request an audience with 
both Daru and Napoleon, thinking that the Emperor would wish to be 
directly consulted. Chigi found out very quickly that this procedure 
was now mistaken. He was quickly informed that he need meet only 
with the Foreign Minister as under the liberal reforms the new min-
isters had far more authority than previously. "Such diligence," 
3Ibid. 
4Antonelli to Chigi, #57565, January 10, 1870, loc. cit, 
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he wrote, ·ir have believed to be more opportune, indeed even neces-
sary, because I know posi.tively that in all deliberations which concern 
public affairs, the minister deals with them categorically. Accord-
i.ng to the new system, the operation of parliamentary rule, o •• all 
the participants [in a cabinet meeting] deal with the Emperor minis -
terially and His Majesty seems merely to preside. 115 
An early test for the Ollivier Ministry was the shooting of the 
republican Victor Noi.r by the infamous Pierre Bonaparte, a disgraced 
cousin of the Emperor. The possibility of turni.ng Noi.r's funeral 
into an anti-government demonstration was thwarted by Ollivier's 
famous quotation on threatening to use force to break up any such 
demonstration yet affirming that his government was one of peace 
and order. Chigi wrote in glowing terms to Antonelli. on January 18 
of his admiration for the government and how it handled the situa -
tion. The government's action showed it possessed "all the con-
di.ti.ons of a great vitality and a splendid success.'' The ministry 
was now viewed by public opinion on all sides as having "dignity, 
force, capacity undiminished.'' All factions were now rallied around 
Olli.vier's leadership. 6 
5Rapp 1530, January 11, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 
248, f 2, fol. 5. 
6Rapp 1535, January 18, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 
248, f 1, fol. 9. 
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In early February, a strike by workers at the Le Creusot 
steelworks in Paris was broken up by use of troops, the first such 
instance in France since the 1850 1s. Chigi made reference to how 
the workers were tightly organized and how there were revolutionary 
elements among them. He praised the troops for the restraint 
shown, how they reacted only when acted upon, and the fact that the re 
were no deaths and only minimal wounds. However, he thought that 
the Ollivier ministry was setting a dangerous precedent for itself, 
that it could perhaps reap what it has sown. An important lesson for 
Rome was that Olliver had indicated that he could well follow the same 
course of action if the papal government was threatened by simi.lar 
. 7 
revolut10nary outbreaks. 
The sessions of the Vatican Council had been underv::ay since 
December 8, 1869; but the proceedings at Rome had little occupied 
Chigi's attention during the first part of 1870. The French govern-
ment had likewise given little heed to the sessions. Upon taking office, 
Daru had in a Senate speech disclaimed any interest on the part of the 
Foreign Ministry and had thus re -affirmed the hands -off policy enun-
ciated by his predecessor La Tour d'Aubergne the previous September. 
Until late February, Chigi 1s correspondence mentioned little about 
7Rapp 1549, February 11, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, 
R 243, f 3, fols. 54-55. 
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the council debates, the issues under discussion, or the heated argu-
ments .on voting procedure then underway. 
A succinct change in this situation began to appear after the 
text of the scheme de Ecclesia was furtively published by the Augs -
burger Zeitung i.n late January, 1870. The schema contained the 
controversial statement on papal infallibility. It further contained a 
number of sections pertai.ni.ng to relations between Church and State, 
one of which read, "If anyone says that the Church is not a perfect 
society ... or that, in the civil society or in the state, it is subject 
to secular control, let him be anathema. " There we re other portions 
asserting the Church's right to own property, control education, and 
to decide whether the civil power was acting correctly in a moral 
sense. It was this section which aroused the fears of several Euro-
pean civil governments, France in particular, and which produced a 
mild attempt by Daru to effect some sort of intervention in the coun-
8 
cil sessions. 
Other European states, Austria and Prussia especially, were 
to be brought into the affair with the French and through their own 
representatives in Rome. The diplomatic involutions seen in this 
study need not occupy us here. As it turned out, the French action 
8
Lillian Parker Wallace, The Papacy and Eu 
macy, 1869-78 (Chapel Hill., 1948), pp. 72-73 and 7 
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was largely unilateral due to the deference shown France by the other 
powers and because of the lack of substance in Daru's maneuvers. 
Chigi. naturally became a part of the exchanges between Paris and 
Rome. He managed to present the Vatican's case in a very deter-
mined way, but the eventual failure of the French efforts cannot be 
attributed to Chigi alone. 
Daru 's first move came on February 20 when he sent a dis -
patch for Antonelli to the Marquis de Banneville, French ambassador 
in Rome. expressing strong objection to the wording of the schema 
on Church-State relations. Daru focused his arguments on this por-
tion of de Ecclesia only, offering no comment on the dogma of infalli-
bil ity. which he said was entirely a religious matter. In a cabinet 
meeting on February 21, Daru came face to face with strenuous op-
position from other ministers for his action, and he was forced to 
telegraph Benneville to hold back the dispatch from Antonelli until the 
9 
wording could be toned down. On February 22, Chigi sent word to 
Antonelli that he had caught wind of a "new impression" in the 
government concerning what was happening at Rome. There was a 
great worry as to what would happen to ci.vi.1 society if conciliar 
9
wallace, pp. 83 -84. The full text of Daru 1 s note can be found 
in Acta et Decreta Sacrorum Concili.orum Recenti.orurn, Collectio 
Lacensis (Rome and Fribourg, 18 90), Vol. VII, pp. 1553 -1555. The 
note is in a secti.on devoted to documents between Rome and the vari-
ous governments of Europe on matters related to the council. 
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sanction of the schema was forthcomi.ng, and the government, as far 
as Chi.gi was able to determine, was definitely going to make some 
move. Chigi was further aware of the difficulty Daru was having with 
the cabi.net, but the main fear was that the troops would be withdrawn 
10 from Rome i.f the schema were adopted. 
Chigi was able to see Daru about the matter on March 6. Daru 
was rather cooperative. He admitted that messages had been sent to 
Banneville about French objections to the council, and he showed 
Chigi some of the letters and papers involved. He expressed his 
conviction that the ideas contained in the schema would amount to 
tearing up the Concordat. As far as removing the French garrison 
was concerned, Daru said he realized how such an action would only 
strengthen the cause of the Left in France and he would rather turn 
in his resignation than have any part of withdrawing from Rome. 
Daru then brought up the matter of whether the pope would ad:r.:lit a 
French ambassador to the council sessions. The dispatch of Feb-
ruary 20 had not mentioned this idea as it had contained only the pro-
tests against de Ecclesia, but Daru had made the suggestion of an 
ambassador in notes to other civil powers. Only by the time of this 
conference with Chigi was the matter brought before a papal repre -
10 Rapp 1554, February 22, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, 
R 165, f 3, fols. 88-89. 
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sentative. Chigi and Daru simply went over possible candidates for 
the position (namely Banneville, Parieu, and the Due de Broglie), 
but nothing was said on the legitimacy of admitting an ambassador of 
a civil power to a church counci.1. In his report, Chigi made no com-
11 
ment on Da ru' s request or on the candidates suggested. 
Antonelli' s response to Chigi 's report was couched in no un -
certain terms. He spoke of what he called "the strange interpreta-
tions attached to this document [de Ecclesia] 11 saying that they were 
none other than the product of unjust ideas on the nature of the Church." 
He considered it a false concept to say that the rights of the Church 
impinged upon the civil power. He promised that his upcoming state -
ment would set things clear as to the meaning of the articles in the 
schema and would "serve to undeceive the honorable Comte Darci in 
his ill-conceived convictions that the schema would tend to tear up 
the Concordat. . • . The conclusions of the council ... will never 
have as an effect the abolition of the Concordat." Antonelli refrained 
from making any direct reference to the Daru note of February 20 or 
12 
to the ambassador's proposal. 
11 Rapp 1566, March 8, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, ANP, 1869= 
70. 
12 Antonelli to Chigi, #58260, March 18, 1870, loc. cit. 
There is difficulty experienced in analyzing diplomatic documents 
and trying to maintain proper chronology because of the ti.me lag 
involved in transmitting notes between emissary and foreign minis -
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In mid-March, Baron Karl de Werther, Prussian ambassador 
m Paris, told Chigi that Count Otto von Bismarck was thinking of 
responding in a positive way to the French proposal for common 
action against the council. Chigi told Antonelli about this but coun-
tered the development by saying that talk in the Diplomatic Corps at 
Paris was that religious questions should be kept apart from political 
ones. The re was hesitation by both Catholic and Protestant powers 
to interfere in any way in the council, and, despite what Werther had 
said, the mood Chigi read was that deference was going to ~e given 
13 
to France's initiatives. Antonelli wrote back that the proposal of 
which Werther had spoken had been definitely refused. He further 
try. By the time an ambassador, or in this case a nuncio has sent 
something to his chief and received a response, several days have 
elapsed. Important other events may have occurred in the mean-
time. 
In the Chigi-Antonelli correspondence, there was a variance 
of four to nine days from the date of a Chigi rapporto to the date of 
a direct response by Antonelli. Then it would be several more 
days until Secretary of State's answer would be delivered to Chigi. 
Telegraph was, of course, used in emergency situations, and these 
are so noted, There is no way of telling how often Antonelli \vas 
able to answer the same day he received something from ChigL 
Since the focus of this paper is Chigi and his view of things 
in Paris rather than Antonelli and how things looked from Rome, 
the emphasis is laid upon how all this transmission appeared in 
Paris. The reader is advised not to pay much attention to the dates 
of some of Antonelli is statements, no matter how late they may 
seem. 
13 Rapp 1575, March 21" 1870, loc. cit, 
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enjoined Chigi to discourage the talk of concerted action and of the 
more frequently heard proposal of a French ambassador to the coun-
14 
cil. 
Antonelli's most forthright statement on the French note of 
February 20 came on March 19 and was presented to Daru on March 
26. Antonelli opened by assuring that the Holy Father was as a pp re -
dative as ever for the protection afforded by France for the freedom 
of the council. The Holy See further understood that Daru's interest 
was prompted by sincere and devoted sentiments on his part, Anton-
elli said he could not see how de Ecclesia had caused such a change 
of viewpoint in the French cabinet. He took special pains to declare 
that the objectionable section of the schema did not give the Church 
or the Roman Pontiff absolute power over the civil authority. al-
though there was certainly something to be said of the superiority of 
the spiritual over the temporal on all levels. The Church is a per-
feet society, said Antonelli, and it is the one to decide what shall 
be rendered unto Caesar and what shall be rendered unto God. 
The principles as enunciated in de Ecclesia, Antonelli con-
tinued, had been taught by the Catholic Church for centuries. The 
essential purpose in debating and proclaiming them in the council 
was mainly "to recall to modern society the divine precents of jus -
14Antonelli to Chigi, #58358, March 30, 1870, loc, cit. 
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tice and honesty and to bring again to the world that peace and pros -
perity which only can be attained by the observance of the divine 
law." The French government, he said, had no reason to intervene 
in the deliberations of the council. Despite Daru 1s contention, there 
was no provision in the Concordat of 1801 allowing the French gov-
ernment to have a representative at any Church council. The adoption 
of de Ecclesia would not in any manner alter the relations between 
France and the Holy See and any other civil government. Antonelli 
said he hoped that the French would not continue to insist on ha-dng an 
ambassador at the council or on having any say on any council mat-
15 
ters. 
As stated above, Chigi presented this note to Daru on March 
26. Because the meeting was rather short and was part of the weekly 
reception given by· the Foreign Minister to the Diplomatic Corps, 
Chigi requested a later appointment with Daru to sound him out more 
thoroughly. Daru would have more time to sample the sentiments 
of other members of the cabinet. Accordingly, the two did not meet 
again until March 31. Daru said that the response of Antonelli was 
benevolent and deferential in tone but severe and regretful in content 
15Collectio Lac ens is, Vol. VII, pp. 1555-1557. The author 
could not find a manuscript copy of this note in either the Vatican 
Archives or the Fre11ch Foreign Ministry Archives. A copy ap-
peared in the Memorial Diplomatique, May 7, 1870, pp. 349-350. 
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because of the rejection of the ambassador request. The Foreign 
Minister was inclined to modify his position on the ambassador ques -
tion, but he thought some way remained for the French to continue 
pressure and eventually get their ideas before the council. 
16 
On April 2, Chigi sent notice to Rome of an impending <level-
opment which would effectively end the current maneuvers of Daru. 
A project which had long been talked about in French political circles 
was about to come to fruition: the idea of holding a plebiscite to sub-
mit to national approval all Napoleon III 1s recent liberal reforms. 
Chigi saw two motives in the decision to go for the plebiscite. First, 
the government wanted to see the Imperial dynasty receive a renewed 
stamp of approval which a favorable plebiscite would indicate. The 
second motive was that the Imperialist party would be able by such 
an act of power and energy to destroy the opinion that it was defunct 
and lifeless. Chigi thought the Imperialists were aiming at the forces 
of the Left, especially the Republicans and Orleanists. 
16 
The question of whether to hold a plebiscite had now reached 
cabinet-level discussion. Although the decision to hold a plebiscite 
was likely to be made, there was a split in the cabinet. The t\•:o 
obstinate ministers were Buffet at Finances and Daru. Chigi under-
16 
Rapp 1586, April 2, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248, 
f 1, fols. 108-109. 
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understood these two to be opposed to holding a plebiscite because 
they were more inclined toward Orleanism, and plebiscites did not 
enter into a liberal monarchy scheme of government. Chigi thought 
it very likely that a ministerial crisis would result because of the 
17 
disagreement and that Daru stood to lose because of his position. 
Several days later, on April 8, Chigi reported that the govern-
ment had definitely changed plans from sending an ambassador to the 
council to the idea of submitting a memorandum. This memorandum 
would be placed directly before the council thereby insuring that the 
French point of view would be communicated to the council partici-
18 
pants. On April 12, when the cabinet decided to go ahead with the 
plebiscite• Daru promptly resigned along with Buffet. Chigi was 
elated that his prediction of several days earlier had come true. He 
told Antonelli that the departure of Daru did not surprise too many 
observe rs, for many had doubted all along that he could re ma in much 
longer as Foreign Minister. Daru 's successor was not immediately 
19 
named, and Olliver temporarily assumed the portfolio. 
17 Rapp 1587, April 3, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248, 
f 3, fols. 56-57. 
18 
Rapp 1590, April 8, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, ANP, 1869-70. 
19 
Rapp 1591., April 12, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248, 
f 3, fols. 6 0 -61. 
Wallace states that when Daru resigned, "The news was tele -
graphed to Rome, 'Daru resigns. Ollivier takes his place. Council 
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The business of the proposed memorandum remained at hand 
despite Daru's departure. It had by now been drawn up, approved by 
the cabinet, and sent on to Banneville who was trying to obtain an 
audience with Pius IX to make the formal presentation, Chigi sus -
pected that Daru still had had collective action by the powers in mind 
because he had sent copies of the memorandum to the other govern-
ments. The Austrians had responded by stating approval of what it 
contained but no moreg and Chigi thought that the remaining cabinets 
had made similar answers. Sentiment for concerted action did not 
. . 20 
seem to be bu1ldmg. 
With Daru's resignation, the main support for French inter-
vention was gone. The oral backing of the other pO\i.·ers was still to 
be had, but within the French cabinet there was no one who would 
continue to push the issue. Consequently, Banneville was left to 
present the memorandum without firm advocacy from Paris. He 
was not able to see Antonelli until April 15, and he did not see Pius 
IX until a week later. In this audience, the Pope refused to lay the 
21 
memorandum before the council. 
free.'" ~· cit., p. 98. She does not say who sent this note, and 
there is no indication at the Vatican Archives that Chigi sent such a 
telegram. 
20 
Rapp 1591, loc. cit. 
21 
Wallace, pp. 99-100. 
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During this same period, Chigi 1s reports to Antonelli indic;i te 
that the. memora.ndum proposal had ceased to occupy the center of 
attention. Of six reports sent to Rome between April 12 and April 
22, not one mentioned anything about the council or the memorandum. 
Only by April 21 did Chigi have an opportunity to see Ollivier after 
he took over as acting Foreign Minister. In their conversation, 
Chigi and Ollivier centered on renewed felicitations between the Holy 
See and France, an understanding that there would be no change in 
the status of French troops at Rome, and a pledge by Ollivier to get 
to the business of naming bishops once the plebiscite was completed, 
22 
There was no talk of the council. 
In the papal correspondence, Antonelli wrote the last word 
on the French inten·ention move in a note to Chigi dated May 7. 
Chigi had \Vritten him a week earlier saying that members of the 
Diplomatic Corps had been asking him what had happened to the French 
memorandum. The word was out that Banneville had made the pre-
sentation, but a response had not been made public. Antonelli told 
Chigi that the Pope did not find it suitable to give any response as the 
memorandum did not contain anything substantially different from 
the first French note of February 20. The answer Antonelli gave on 
22Rapp 1597, April 22, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 
248, f 3, fols. 62-63. 
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March 19 was sufficient. Antonelli said he was quite content that 
Ollivier.had indicated that the memorandum be allowed to lapse with-
out an answer. The whole d~marche instigated by Daru, tenuous from 
23 
the start, evaporated into oblivion. 
In the early part of May, newspaper accounts circulated con-
cerning alleged plots against the Emperor's life; the Journal Officiel 
noted, for example, the arrest of a number of conspirators on May 1, 
but played down any danger. Chigi thought that the publicity would 
discourage "the friends of the revolution" from their determination 
to take any action. Ollivier did tell Chigi that the danger was more 
real than the newspaper accounts had indicated, but so far, all co::J.-
spiracy rings had been uncovered. Chigi thought the government 
release of the information was designed to shake some of the indif-
ference off the electorate before the plebiscite. The ministry was 
now more secure than ever in its expectation of the outcome, and it 
d d 1 . 'd . 1 24 regarde the isc osure of the mtrigue as prov1 entla • 
The long-awaited plebiscite was held on May 8. Chigi was 
pleased with the favorable result--a nationwide majority of 7 to l in 
23
Rapp 1599, April 29, 1870 and Antonelli to Chigi, May 7, 
1870; both in ASV, Segr di St, ANP, 1869-70. 
24Rapp 1600, May 3, 1870 and Rapp 1602, May 6, 1870, 
ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248, f 3, fols. 68-69 and 72-73. Jour-
nal Officiel, May 1, 1870, p. 753. 
-45-
favor of the Empire. He wrote to Ron1e that the government's ex-
pectations were "splendidly justified. 11 One could easily determine 
that considerable content and satisfaction had taken hold of the Em-
peror and the cabinet. Reports of disorder in Paris and in the other 
great cities of France on the day of voting were unconfirmed, but the 
fact of the rumors was an indication to Chigi that revolutionary de -
signs did continue to exist along with the fears that these designs 
25 
created. 
With the end of the Daru council intervention move, the break-
ing up of the assassination ring, and the finishing of the plebiscite, 
Chigi thought it an opportune moment to have an audience with the 
Emperor. He saw both Napoleon and Eugenie on May 13 at the 
Tuileries. Chigi opened by telling Napoleon of the relief Pius IX felt 
because of the unc·overing of the plots against the Emperor's life. A 
discussion on infallibility then followed. Despite all that had been 
done and said during the Daru d~marche, Napoleon III was still evi-
dently concerned about the effects adoption of de Ecclesia with its 
assertion of Church rights would have on Franco-Vatican relations. 
The Empress was likewise concerned about infallibility. She 
spoke in a pronounced manner of her fears that the definition would 
bring about the alienization even defection from the faith by many 
25Rapp 1604, May 10, 1870, loc. cit., fols. 74-75. 
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Catholics. Chigi strove to point out that these fears were exaggerated 
and were rooted i.n Gallicanism, for which Their Majesties certainly 
had no sympathy. The great Concordat of Napoleon I was the most 
eloquent and peremptory condemnation of Gallicani.sm. Chi.gi. thought 
the points he raised went a long way towards quelling the fears of the 
Imperial couple and that Eug~nie especially was moved to having 
d h h b h 1 d . . f ll"b·1· 
26 
secon t oug ts a out er qua ms regar mg 1n a 1 1 1ty. 
Si.nee the resignation of Daru on April 12, Ollb:i.er had carried 
the portfolio of the Foreign Ministry, but in mid-May the new minis -
ter was appointed, Antoine -Alfred Due de Gramont, who had been 
serving as ambassador in Vienna. Gramont, of course, \\tas to play 
out his unenviable and co!ltroversial role later i.n the Ems Dispatch 
Crisis and the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. The Due was 
not unknown in Vatican circles as he had been assigned to Rome pre -
viously. Chigi reported that Gramont 1s religious principles were 
so manifest that he did not have to inform Rome on that matter. Two 
other ministers were appointed at the same time, Charles Pli.chon 
at Public Works and Jacques Mege at Cults. Chigi spoke very highly 
of these two in terms of their religious devotion and their loyalty to 
26 Rapp 1607, May 14, 1870, ASV, Segr di. St, A 1870, R 243, 
f 2, fols. 72-75. 
27 
the Temporal Power. 
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Chigi's first conference with Gramont came May 19, Gra-
mont was quite effusive in telling Chigi how highly he regarded the 
Pope, and Chigi thus thought that Gramont would prove very depend-
able to Rome, Gramont also said that interpolations and "violent 
motions" could be expected soon in the Legislative Corps soon 
regarding the council. He told Chigi not to worry, that the govern-
28 
ment could handle the situation should it arise. 
On May 21, 1870, Chigi and the rest of the Diplomatic Corps 
participated in the ceremony at the Tuileries marking the official 
proclamation of the results of the plebiscite. The occasion was the 
last triumph of the Second Empire and the last great ceremony of its 
life. Talk and publicity had earlier been in diplomatic circles that 
Chigi was leading a movement to use the gathering to address a col-
lective note of congratulation from the Diplomatic Corps to the 
Emperor because of his success. Chigi denied in a report to Anton-
elli that such a move was underway. He said that as far as he knew 
the English ambassador, Lord Lyons, and the Austrian ambassador, 
Prince Richard von Metternich, were going to offer the individual 
27 
Rapp 1610, May 17j 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 
248, f 3, fols. 78-79. 
28
Rapp 16_, May 20, 1870, loc. cit., fols. 80-81. 
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greetings of their sovereigns to Napoleon because of the uncove ry of 
the assassination plots earlier in the month. Chigi had done this 
for Pius IX in the audience of May 13, but he felt a collective con-
gratulations by diplomatic representati'ves would have been inte rfe r -
29 
ing in French politics. 
On June 3, Chigi met again with Gramont, and the points they 
dealt with were the council, the sojourn of French troops in Rome, 
and the finances of the Papal States. On the council, Gramont said 
that action could still be expected in the chambers but that the Holy 
See should neither take offense nor be upset. He said that he had !"lot 
spoken of nor given the least thought to bringing out the troops i and 
in regard to papal finances, Gramont indicated that the time was not 
ripe at the moment, but perhaps in the immediate future some meas-
30 
ures could be taken to bring relief to the Holy See 1s treasury, 
29Rapp 1602, May 6, 1870, loc. cit., fols. 70-72. Refer-
ences to this rumored action we re made in M«!morial Diplornatique, 
May 5, 1870, p. 339 and May 10, 1870, p. 353, 
Lord Lyons thought that Metternich was the main catalyst 
behind the move to present the collective congratulations and that 
Chigi merely made some inquiries among other diplomats and found 
them gene rally cool on the suggestion, Lord Newton, Lord Lyons, 
A Record of British Diplomacy (London, 1913), VoL 1, pp. 287-
288. 
In Henry Salomon, ~ambassade de Richard Metternich a 
Paris (Paris, 1931), p. 245, reference is made only to the fact that 
Mette rni.ch directed a personal congratulatory note on the plebiscite 
from Franz Joseph to Napoleon III. 
30 Rapp 1620, June 3, 1870i ASV, loc. cit., fols. 97-98. This 
:_~_.,-, 
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After this all-inclusive conference and its amiable results, 
Chigi found time to leave Paris for the baths at Marienbad to get 
some long-needed treatment. The month of June spelt the beginning 
of the summer hiatus in Paris, and the time was as good as any for 
a respite. Chigi was gone from Paris from approximately June 5 
through June 15.. The fortnight spent at the resort did not bring 
complete rest and diversion to the nuncio, as the ingredients for 
another "publication of letters" controversy were put together dur· 
ing Chigi's absence. 
A letter addressed to Chigi from Monsignor Francesco Mer-
curellijl one of Pius !X's private secretaries, was published in 
~ 
L 1Univers, Le Monde;, and the Memorial Diplomatigue on June 21. 
The letter said that the Pope was quite satisfied with the many letters 
and messages of support for infallibility which had been received in 
the past few months from .the French clergy,. and si.nce so large a 
number of such messages had come to Rome, he found it impossible 
to answer them all individually. Mercurelli asked Chigi to make 
individual answers and to make a general statement of the Pope's 
appreciation. As on the previous occasions during the 1860's, the 
is one of the few references to papal finances that this paper will 
make. However, the Chigi rapporti say much about papal finances 
because the Vatican made several loans with French banks including 
the Rothschilds. Also, the Peter 1s Pence Collection was taken up 
monthly in France and was forwarded to Rome through the nunciature. 
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French government took exception to the publication and was upset 
that the nuncio had been enjoined to communicate with the clergy. 
The old phrase, "Le nonce n'est qu'un ambassadeur," re-appeared 
31 
in a memo from the Minister of Cults to Ollivier. 
This particular incident did not grow to the proportions of 
the earlier ones. Chigi quickly pointed out to the Quai d'Orsay that 
he had been away from Paris when the note arrived and that a lower 
official in the nunciature had taken receipt of it. Thinking the letter 
was of interest to the French clergy, the official judged that news-
paper publication was the best way of handling the situation. Chigi 
verbally told Gramont how the error came about 1 and the whole mat-
ter was quietly and quickly dropped. A repetition of the Nice affair 
32 
and the Syllabus letters was not to be had. 
Towards the end of June and the beginning of July, Chigi 
found himself pre-occupied with some rather routine matters. An-
tonelli wanted him to inquire as to the status of the recruiting station 
of the Roman Legion which Antonelli understood was about to be 
31 
Information on Chigi's absence from Paris is in Antonelli 
to Chigi, #59041, May 30, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, ANP, 1869-70 
and Rubricella 343 (1870). The Mercurelli letter is in ANP, 1869-
70 and Memorial Diplomatique, June 21, 1870, p. 495. The French 
memo is Mege to Ollivier, June 20, 1870, AN, F 19 1924. 
32Rapp 1626, July 1, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870 1 R 248, 
£ 3, fols. 162-163; Journal Officiel, June 24, 1870, p. 1077; and 
M~morial Diplomatique 1 June 25, 1870, pp. 498-499. 
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transferred from Altkirch in eastern France to Limoges, west of 
Paris. Antonelli wanted Chigi to find out if the rumors of the trans -
fer were true and what such a change would mean to the status of the 
legion. Another matter of interest was the continuing threat of an 
interpellation in the chambers on the government's attitude toward 
the council. On July 1, Chigi wrote that Gramont had told him that 
Daru might spearhead such an attack but that the cabinet was prepared. 
A few days later, Chigi devoted much attention in a dispatch to a re-
quest by the Orleanist Princes to have the decree of exile against 
33 
them repealed. 
Chigi 's pursuit of the status of the Roman Legion recruiting 
station was to be fruitless. The expected interpellation led by Daru 
would never come. In the same dispatch in which Chigi devoted so 
much space to the ·relatively innocuous petition of the Orleanists, he 
made ~is first mention of the Hohenzollern Candidacy to the Spanish 
throne. 
At this point, some assessment can be made of Chigi's per-
33
niscussion of Roman Legion recruiting station in Antonelli 
to Chigi, June 10, 1870, ASV, ANP, Segr di St, ANP, 1869-70 and 
in Rapp 1623, June 17, 1870 and Rapp 1623, June 28, 1870, ASV, 
Segr di St, A 1870, R 190, f 2, fols. 119-120 and 113-114. 
Gramont remarks about Daru quoted in Rapp 1626, July 
1, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248, f 3, fols. 162-163 and 
Chigi remarks about Orleanist in Rapp 1628, July 8, 1870, loc. cit., 
fols. 165-166. 
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forrnance as an ambassador, leaving aside the particular issues he 
faced in these first six months of 1870 such as the council interven-
tion move and the plebiscite. Such an estimation is better placed 
here because things were to be so different after the outbreak of the 
Franco-Prussian War. Certain trends and patterns emerge which 
indicate some of Chigi's outlook and his manner of handling situa-
tions. 
A striking but not altogether unexpected aspect of Chigi 's 
reports is his way of evaluating members of the French government 
rather solely in terms of their personal devotion and their support 
of the Temporal Power. That this kind of subject matter appears in 
the writing of a Roman clergyman in the service of an about-to-be 
infallible pope perhaps should not surprise anyone, and, given the 
official nature of Catholicism in the Second Empire, this kind of 
appraisal might seem somewhat appropriate. Yet one would think 
that a nuncio should be telling Rome more about a cabinet member: 
such things as his family and political background, his ability to 
handle his new post, and some of the projects or programs the new 
minister might have in mind. The Vatican and its nuncio should 
have been concerned about these other factors surrounding members 
of the government. Chi.gi should have furnished much great infor-
mation on the key cabinet positions of Minister of Cults and the For-
eign Minister, who activities and outlooks would affect the status of 
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the Catholic Church in France and the survival of the Temporal 
Power regardless of the number of prayers they said or the endless 
pledges of support for the Temporal Power. That Chigi's vision 
was so limited was one of his major shortcomings. 
Another side of Chigi is his almost paranoid concern for keep -
ing the French troops in Rome and his constant inquiry as to whether 
they were about to be removed. Instances of this appeared in. Chigi's 
meetings with Daru and later with Ollivier and Gramont, when the 
nuncio was the one who was always asking if the troops were about 
to be pulled out. When Chigi first heard of Daru's council interven-
tion plan, his first impulse was to link any such scheme to the threat 
of pulling out the garrison. There is no evidence that Daru had any 
suc'h project in mind. Chigi 's fears of French abandonment of Rome 
was consistent thr'oughout the 1860 1s as well. Often the words 
"ritir~ delle truppe'' appear in dispatches during that period even 
though the government in Paris had given no hint of such an action. 
Chigi 's rare comments on French politics seem somewhat 
untenable, at times naive. For example, he mentions Orleanism 
numerous times, apparently regarding it as a potent force on the 
French political scene. At one point he classified Orleanism as a 
force of the Left. The evidence elsewhere is that Or lean ism was 
barely organized at this point in the Second Empire and its adherents 
were few; an Orleanist party hardly existed in the chambers. Chigi 
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gives some attention to the republican elements in France but always 
lops them with extreme revolutionary groups. Such a mistaken 
generalization would be expected from a nineteenth-century church-
man whose education and exposure were so severely restricted. 
Chigi's reaction to the Le Creusot strike and the conspiracies in 
early May were more vertiginuous than the government's. 
What is lacking in the Chigi reports is a continuing and pointed 
analysis of French politics. His references to parties and opposi-
tion groups are in the vaguest of terms, and there is little talk of 
chamber debates. Chigi 's political comments are prompted only by 
specific events such as civil strife or ministerial changes. The state 
of French politics was critical to the Vatican's interests, and Chigi 
would better have served those interests by a greater awareness of 
the whole picture .. 
Chigi's place and standing within the Diplomatic Corps is 
hazardous to assess because the evidence for forming such a judg-
ment is extremely sketchy. It has already been pointed out that the 
French Foreign Ministry Archives are scant in resum~s on Chigi. 
Standard secondary monographs on other important diplomats in 
Paris such as Lord Lyons and Metternich make little reference to 
Chigi. Chigi himself writes only obliquely of other ambassado:::-s, 
seldom mentioning any by name. Chigi's role as Dean of the Corps 
came into play only on ceremonial occasions. There is little to 
-55-
indicate that he displayed much leadership among his fellow ambas-
34 
sadors. 
This consideration has thus far elicited a view of Archbishop 
Flavio Chigi at Paris as an ambassador qua ambassador. The sum 
total is that he was something less than competent and was crucially 
short-sighted. It has been observed how Chigi acted under "normal" 
circumstances. After mid-July of 1870, the predicament in which 
Chigi found himself was anything but normal. 
34The references cited inn. 29 above are about all that is 
said in Lord Newton's work on Lord Lyons and Salomon's mono-
graph on Metternich concerning Chigi. In the case of one other 
important member of the Paris Diplomatic Corps, namely the Am-
erican minister Elihu Washburne, that situation was quite different 
as will be seen in later chapters. 
CHAPTER III 
THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDACY, THE 
FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR, AND THE 
FALL OF THE SECOND EMPIRE 
The Hohenzollern Candidacy to the Spanish throne came into 
Flavia Chigi's life with the same unexpected suddenness that it en-
tered the general European scene. Foreign ministries everyv;here 
commented on how no serious problems loomed on the horizon. It 
was summer, and everyone was on holiday. There had been no hint 
of a direct confrontation between France and Prussia since 1866. 
Powers such as England and Russia remained on the outside looking 
in, offering little chance to upse~ the equilibrium. States such as 
Austria and Italy had too many internal problems to indicate that they 
would cause any trouble that would disturb the peace. Finally, in 
far-off Spa in, Carlist wars, pronunciamentos, and civil strife had 
been the order of the day for so long that no one seemed to take notice. 
The Spanish had turned out their dissolute Queen Isabella II in 1868 
and had been looking for an occupant of the throne ever since. Few 
had any idea that this search would produce the bombshell it did when 
the Cortes under the leadership of the dictator General Juan Prim 
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offered the throne to a member of the Catholic branch of the Prussian 
royal family, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. 
Chigi's activities in June and July of 1870 had not risen above 
the level of the routine. He had shown very little interest in Spanish 
affairs, and the only thing remotely connected with Spanish events 
which came to his attention was some correspondence which he hand-
led for the exiled Isabella, then residing in Paris. This correspond-
ence was superficial and consisted of Chigi forwarding notes from 
Isabella to Rome. The notes and letters were of a formal nature 
and contained nothing in the way of political deals between Isabella 
I 
and the Holy See. 
There is no need to say that after the Hohenzollern Candidacy 
bec'ame public knowledge on July 3, the whole situation was drastic-
ally changed for Chigi. He abruptly found himself handling several 
issues of the most vital and paramount nature. He had to follow the 
intricacies of the unfolding Candidacy crisis and the outbreak of the 
Franco-Prussian War. There was then the war itself to be dealt 
1Most of these notes consisted of formal greetings from Isa-
bella to Pius IX on religious feasts and so on. Chigi did not meet 
with the Queen, he merely acted as a post man. If Isabella wanted 
to follow protocol in sending things to Rome, she had to use the 
Apostolic Nuncio in Paris as she could use neither the Spanish Em-
bassy nor the French Foreign Ministry. 
Several biographies consulted on Isabella and other works 
on Spanish political history of the time indicate nothing on Chigi. 
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with, the disaster of Sedan, and the sudden appearance of the repub-
lic. More importantly, Chigi was faced with the task of protecting 
the Temporal Power and keeping the French troops in Rome, but he 
would see Rome fall nearly as fast as the Second Empire. In the end, 
Chigi was to find himself in a besieged city wondering how to insure 
his own safety and that of the other diplomats. 
The world first heard of the Spanish offer to Leopold on July 
3, 1870. On July 6, the Foreign Minister of France, the Due de 
Gramont, gave his famous chamber speech firmly denouncing the 
prospect of a Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne and affirming 
France's total opposition. It was not until two days later that Chigi 
sent anything about these developments to Cardinal Antonelli. 
Throughout the days of the Candidacy Crisis, Chigi was remarkably 
silent about the events unfolding around him on all sides, and he 
later c.onfessed that things moved so quickly he could barely keep 
up with them and that Rome could get as much information from the 
newspapers as from him. Thus he had little to say directly about 
the original announcement of the Candidacy, Leopold's renunciation, 
or the Ems dispatch. His comments and actions were more general 
as he evidently did not feel that he had to act as a news bureau. It 
will be seen that the Vatican's long-feared specter of France going 
to war and abandoning Rome was immediately before Chigi 's 
2 
eyes. 
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What Chigi had to say in his rapporto of July 8 was important, 
however, even though his remarks came five days after the crisis 
broke and were contained in an almost afterthought fashion at the end 
of a dispatch primarily devoted to the unimportant petition of the Or-
leanist princes. Chigi spoke of how the "stagings" of General Prim 
had provoked such a disagreeable sensation in the French government, 
but, more importantly, he said that experts on Spanish affairs whom 
he had consulted thought the Candidacy was not serious or durable 
and "they think that the emotion felt in the French government is ex-
aggerated and without foundation. 11 These words were the quotation 
of the opinion of others and not Chigi's. The fact that he would send 
the·dispatch to Rome meant perhaps that he leaned in the direction of 
3 
those who felt that France was over-vexed concerning the issue. 
Later the same day, Chigi sent word to Rome of the mood 
France was in now that the crisis was full-blown. Chigi felt he did 
not have to tell Antonelli how excited and repulsed everyone in France 
was because of the news of the offer to Leopold. He thought that the 
2 
Rapp 1634, July 17, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, Anno 1871, R 
242, f 1, fol. 13 for Chigi's later comment about his not being able 
to keep up with events. 
3 Rapp 1628, July 8, 1870, ASVj Segr di St, A 1870, R248, 
f 3, fol. 165. 
r 
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words which Gramont had spoken in the Legislative Assembly two 
, 
days earlier were the exact expression of the sentiments of the 
nation, as the speech had been thunderously applauded. But if Gra-
mont's words had received so much favorable support and reaction, 
there were still many in Paris who thought the speech would have 
the opposite effect than desired, namely that Prussia would be un-
daunted and that the Cortes would be goaded into electing Leopold 
because of the harshness of the French stand. All the talk of Leopold 
needing King William's approval was nonsense, as several years 
earlier another Hohenzollern, Prince Charles, had accepted the 
crown of Rumania without William's consent. Chigi was confident 
that the Candidacy would not be confirmed in Madrid and that the dan-
ger of war would be averted. Even now, Werther, the Prussian en-
voy at Paris, had gone to confer with William at Ems, and Chigi 
4 though~ that only a ''happy and peaceful result would emerge." 
Chigi 1s optimism of July 8 was largely justified. Not all of 
France, either in the nation-at-large or in the government, was 
completely bent on war. The same was true on the Prussian side, 
given the well-known pacific leanings of King William versus the 
belligerent hopes of his chancellor Bismarck. Four days later came 
4 
Rapp 1631, July 8, 1870, ASV, Segr di St. , A 1871, R 242, 
f 1, fols. 3-4. 
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the renunciation by Leopold, the event which seemed to many to end 
the whole affair. Everyone breathed a sigh of relief. Then came 
in rapid succession the famous series of events: the Benedetti inter-
view with Willi.am at Ems, the edited dispatch released by Bismarck, 
and the violent French reaction which did lead to war. 
Unfortunately, some of these particulars went unnoticed by 
Chigi, for his next statement did not come until July 14 in a cipher-
ed telegram to Rome: 
The responses of Prussia carried by Werther 
are evasive. The renunciation of Prince Leopold 
is personal. The sovereign's guarantee that the 
candidacy will not be reproduced is lacking. This 
was formally requested. 
I am not without fear that something has been 
promised to Italy for the evacuation of Civitavecchia. 
5 Gramont has not yet commented. 
Chigi 1s confidence was now shattered. He knew that France 
at war could mean withdrawal from the Papal States, and he was al-
' 
ready doing his best to learn what the French government would do. 
He must have been trying desperately to see Gramont during the days 
of July 12 through 14, but all he could say by the time of this tele-
5ASV, SegrdiSt, Al870, R 165, f7, fol. 17. Most of 
Chigi's telegrams were sent in cipher but decoded, handwritten 
copies are on file at the Vatican Archives. The author did not have 
to do any deciphering, only translating from Italian. Decoded tele-
grams are so marked on the manuscripts and are pieces of papers 
much smaller than the rapporti. 
r 
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gram was that no comment could be obtained. 
On July 15, Chigi sent another telegram: 
Today in the Chambers there came what 
amounted to a declaration of war. Werther is 
gone. Minister of Foreign Affairs has told me 
that for now there will be no change for the troops 
occupying the Pontifical State. Piedmont will 
declare its wish to remain neutral.· 
Actually, Chigi had not seen Gramont by this time but had received 
the assurances through Ollivier. Whether Chigi firmly believed what 
French officials were telling him is doubtful because he doggedly 
pursued the matter and also attempted to find out the attitude of Italy 
. 6 
regardmg the war. 
The fact that Chigi was not able to see Gramont during these 
days is readily understandable given the days -long activities in which 
the cabinet was immersed. Gramont had enough on his mind without 
having to see the papal nuncio on business which was growing less 
important by the hour. The floor was occupied by the nations in-
volved: France, Prussia, and Spain; even the powers of England, 
Austria, and Italy had to take a back seat. There was not much 
room for a nuncio to be seen or heard. Chigi had not built enough 
confidence in the French government or the Diplomatic Corps to be 
called upon or consulted. He represented a sovereign whose stand-
6ASV, SegrdiSt, A 1871, R242, f 1, fol. 11. 
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ing had diminished a long way since the days of Innocent III. Chigi's 
repeated ruffling of feathers of French officials through the 1860 1s 
had left him with no confidantes in important government posts, The 
nuncio had not established a firm and trustworthy relationship with 
Napoleon III. The French position in Rome became inconsequential 
in the whole picture. Chigi had no role in shaping the events of 
July, 1870. 
Chigi's supreme task was to keep the French in Rome, and 
beyond that was the question whether Italy would stay neutral. Chigi 
was able to tell Rome that the French had found out that Italy had 
opted for neutrality, much to the chagrin of the French. Nigra, the 
Italian ambassador in Paris, was spreading the word in the Diplo-
ma tic Corps that Italy wanted to stay neutral "at all costs. " Chigi 
was worried that the Italian king, Victor Emmanuel II, might carry 
the day in Florence despite his own ministers 1 wishes. Chigi. had 
. 
information that Victor Emmanuel was personally determined to 
take up arms along side the French and had written to Napoleon III 
to that effect, suggesting common tactics that the Italian and French 
armies might follow. Though he realized what such an alliance 
would mean to the independence of the Papal States, Chigi did not 
think that Italy would come in so quickly or that the French were 
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7 
realistically depending on the Italians to do so. 
Antonelli said he appreciated all of Chigi's reports and ef-
forts when he wrote to Paris on July 22. Naturally he was pleased 
to hear the French pledge from Ollivier that the garrison would re -
main in Rome, but such a pledge was not enough for the Secretary of 
State. Rumors were rampant throughout Italy, said Antonelli, that 
a deal had been concocted between France and Italy which called for 
the recall of the French troops. Chigi was ordered to continue to 
find out all he could and to keep Rome fully informed. 8 
The next day, July 23, Antonelli sent further instructions to 
Chigi to deliver without delay a note from Pius IX to Napoleon III. 
The note was addressed personally to the Emperor and consisted of 
a last-minute appeal for peace. The Pope indicated that though he 
was sovereign over a small territory, hi.s spiritual and moral auth-
ority was immense. He hoped that Napoleon would put an end to the 
' 
wari1 and specifically offered mediationi1 adding that he had sent the 
same note to William of Prussia. Chigi was told to present this 
7Rapp 1636i1 July 19, 1870, loc. cit., fol. 30. At this junc-
tion in time in 1870, Chigi had nothing to say about the great event 
at Rom ell the proclamation on infallibility. Chigi, of course, had 
more important business to attend to. Beyond that, the likelihood 
is that he refrained from any doctrinal comments because his job 
was that of a diplomat. 
8Antonelli to Chigi, #59660, July 22, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, 
ANP, 18 6 9 - 7 l. 
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note if and when he saw the Emperor. 9 
Chigi 1s long-sought audience with the Emperor came on July 
25 at the suburban palace of St. Cloud. It had taken almost three 
weeks while the crisis raged on and the war broke- out before Chigi 
was able to meet with Napoleon. The audience started in the man-
ner all the previous ones had. Chigi opened with a statement re-
plete with the usual felicitations: the Pope was the great spiritual 
leader, the Pope blessed Napoleon III and his family, Pius IX was 
ever grateful for the French"protection. This last point was especi-
ally crucial at this date, and Chigi enlarged upon it, calling it the 
glory of France and the Emperor. The Holy See was even more 
grateful now because Napoleon had maintained the garrison despite 
the 'needs of war. Chigi limited himself to these remarks, not at 
any point asking tne Emperor directly how much longer, if at all, 
French_ troops would stay in Rome. 
Napoleon III did not mince words. He seized upon Chigi's 
last point by saying without any hesitation that "the needs of war" 
had rendered it indispensable to recall the garrison from Rome. 
This was all Napoleon said, offering no further explanations or apo-
logies. 
Whether Chigi was completely stunned by this announcement 
9Antonelli to Chigi, #59680, July 23a 1870, loc. cit. 
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or had some forewarning, one can only surmise, but he launched 
into furious argument on the portent of the French withdrawal. It 
was fraught with dangers and evil consequences. The security of 
the Papal States was at stake. Italian troops stood poised on the 
border ready to seize Rome. If that was not enough, Chigi said, 
Rome was always faced with the threat of the Garibaldian revolution-
aries within the city itself. Pontifical sovereignty needed the French 
presence. 
Napoleon stood firm despite the nuncio's pleas. He said that 
he could control the Florentine government, that Italy had learned a 
lesson at Mentana several years earlier which it had not forgotten. 
Chigi countered this by asserting that Italy had shown itself 
to be completely irresponsible on a number of occasions in spite of 
treaties solemnly agreed to such as the September Convention. 
, Gramont, who had apparently joined the audience along with 
the Empress Eug~nie, tried to justify the Emperor's decision as a 
military necessity. The French garrison amounted to only five 
thousand men and was not much more than a police force, the Foreign 
Minister said. France further wished to avoid making the same 
mistake that Austria had in the 1866 struggle of having to fight both 
Prussia and Italy. The main theater of the war was to be the border-
lands with Prussia, and France could not risk having to open a second 
front so far to the south. Gramont went on to say that France was 
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not acting from fear, that the decision had been made unilaterally, 
and that the Emperor had written personally to Victor Emmanuel ap-
pealing to the honor of Italy and reminding him of the provisions of 
the September Convention. 
The discussion continued a while longer as Gramont brought 
out some evidence from French diplomatic agents that Italy would 
behave and would not violate papal territory. Chigi continued to 
stress how essential it was for the French to stay and how the Pope's 
own resources were not enough. His arguments did not go much 
deeper than this, and it was apparent that the French would not yield. 
Chigi finally gave up hope of dissuading the Emperor and asked for a 
later audience, which he never received. Napoleon left for the front 
several days later himself, never to return to Paris. July 25 was 
the last time Nuncio and Emperor were to meet. It was their thirty-
10 
second and final conference. 
Chigi had no opportunity to offer the personal note from Pius 
IX with its offer of mediation. He wrote to Antonelli that the an-
nouncement of the troop withdrawal had precluded discussion of any 
other items. Furthermore~ Chigi thought, the Pope's offer was too 
10
chigi 1s description of his audience with Napoleon III is 
spread over two rapporti, 1640 and 1641, dated July 26 and July 27, 
1870P respectively, both found in ASV, loc. cit. There is no refer-
ence to this audience in the French National Archives or the Foreign 
Ministry Archives. 
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little and too late, as France was already so enthusiastically and 
11 deeply at war. 
The reaction from Rome was rather muted. Antonelli told 
Chigi that he understood fully how hard the nuncio had tried to change 
the Emperor's mind on the decision to recall. He took no comfort 
in Gramont's contention that Italy could be trusted, emphasizing his 
own belief, similar to Chigi 1s that Italy did not have a reputation 
f .d. 12 or ab1 mg by conventions or agreements. 
An appointment which Chigi had a week later with Gramont 
produced no further results. Gramont offered declarations from 
the ministry in Florence that they would abide by the September Con-
vention and not intervene in papal territory, and he informed Chigi 
of other intelligence which indicated that Italy would hold off. Chigi 
remained unconvinced as did Antonelli, who told Chigi later that 
Italian intervention would come after contrived plots had been hatch-
' 
ed. Antonelli thought that even though France had departed from 
Rome, perhaps it would pledge to return to protect the Pope should 
13 
Italy try to move in. 
12 
Antonelli to Chigi, #59809, August 3, 1980, lac. ciL 
13 Rapp 1644, August 2, 1870, and Antonelli to Chigi, :!±59876, 
August 10, 1870, ASV 1 lac. cit. 
r 
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For the rest of the month of August, the question of French 
protection at Rome seems to have fled Chigi 's mind. His reports 
and other papers indicate that he was deeply engrossed in the pro-
gress of the war, following its every turn and sending almost daily 
accounts to Rome. The expected hand-wringing, knocking at the 
Foreign Minister's door, attempts to see the Emperor, frantic mes -
sages to the Vatican, stern instructions from Antonelli, efforts at 
gaining the support of prominent French politicians (or even the Em-
press) were all missing, indicating that the French withdrawal was 
not totally unexpected and the Vatican was not caught completely off-
guard. Chigi had often in the past come to the conclusion that the 
French were about to pull out. When they finally did as a major war 
began, he could not have been totally surprised. Through August, 
then, Chigi studied a nation at war, and his testimony during that 
month reads almost as a history of the war as seen from Paris. 
Chigi was quite aware of the preparations underway once the 
French had made the declaration. He marvelled at the numbers of 
men and quantities of material moving through Paris on the way to 
the front. He noted now the enthusiasm for war was so great in the 
chambers, how the Emperor's government was stronger, and how 
public fervor grew day by day. He followed closely the various 
maneuverings of the French army, how it was divided into several 
corps, and the campaigns it followed. Every indication is that Chigi 
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was supporting France quite apart from his official position which 
would also wish for a French triumph. The optimistic temper which 
reigned in Paris in the summer of 1870 caught hold of Chigi along 
with so many others. All believed that France would win. Even 
after Chigi reported that the French would leave Rome, he spoke of 
the courage of the French troops and "the hope of final victory which 
14 
would confirm the superiority of the French Army." 
Everything changed on August 4-5 as the French met early 
minor defeats at Forsbach and Wissemberg on the French-Prussian 
frontier. These two battles were relatively minor scrapes in which 
the French received small setbacks. Politically the effect was 
devastating as the general public began to realize the sorry shape of 
the, Army. Militarily, the effect was equally as devastating in the 
next several days .as the French forces could not adequately re-group 
and they began their haphazard retreat which would allow them to be 
trapped at Sedan. 
Chigi 's communication to Rome was abruptly punctuated with 
a telegram on August 7 telling of the defeats and how they made the 
situation grave. Paris was readying itself for seige, a government 
crisis ensued as the Chambers had been convoked, an appeal would 
14Chigi 1s war information contained in Rapp 1634, July 17, 
1870 and Rapp 1636, July 19, 1870, both in ASV, Se gr di St, A 1871, 
R 242, f 1, fols. 13-17 and 32-33. 
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be made to all the defensive forces of the nation, and the government 
and the populace were resolved to defend themselves at all costs. 
In a full dispatch two days later, Chigi spoke of Forsbach and Wis sen-
berg as "un disastro generale" and of the feverish preparations al-
ready in progress for the defense of Paris. 15 
As August wore on, Chigi noted a great air of resentment had 
grown in the city despite the appearance of public calm. Dissatis-
faction appeared everywhere because of the erroneous government 
announcements on the number of troops in the Army, the falsified 
accounts from the front, and the generally inept way mobilization 
was handled. He complained, along with a great many French citi-
zens, that the only way to learn what was happening in the war zone 
was to read the English newspapers which were uncensored and cir-
culated daily in thQ French capital. Chigi felt strongly that trouble 
was brewing, and several times he mentioned revolution as a distinct 
. 
possibility. The Emperor had better find himself a victory in the 
field or be faced with problems back home with which he could not 
cope. As the French armies under MacMahon, Bazaine, and the 
Emperor regrouped themselves, the feeling at Paris improved. As 
late as August 22, Chigi said that the French expected a "decisive 
15 
Telegram, August 7, 1870 and Rapp 1648, August 9, 1870, 
bothinASV, loc. cit., fols. 90and 129-130. 
16 
victory" soon. 
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On August 24, Chigi held his last conference with a Foreign 
Minister of the Second Empire. Prince La Tour d'Auvergne was now 
Foreign Minister, as Gramont had resigned along with the rest of 
the Ollivier ministry after Forsbach and Wissemberg. La Tour 
d 1Auvergne repeated much of what Gramont had said earlier. He had 
proof and assurance from Florence that the government would observe 
the September Convention and guarantee the integrity and independ-
ence of the present pontifical territory. Nigra had continually given 
such reports to the Quai d 'Orsay. At one point, the Italian am bas -
sador had shown La Tour d 'Auvergne confidential instructions for 
General Cadorna, the Italian commander of troops now drawn up 
along the papal frontier, that the General was to observe a line run-
ning from Orvieto·to Rieti (both towns are about sixty miles north of 
Rome) and proceed no further. Chigi did not give his reaction to 
. 
this meeting, but most likely he remained unimpressed. 17 
Even though Chigi could talk at such a late date with the For-
16 Rapp 1650, August 11, 1870; Rapp 1652, August 18, 1870; 
and Rapp 1654, August 22, 1870; all contained in ASV, loc. cit., 
fols. 133-34, 137-38, and 151-53. 
17Rapp 1655, August 24, 1870, ASV, Segr di St A 1870, R 
165, f 3, fols. 96-97. In this report, Chigi does not say what he 
himself said in the interview nor does there exist any response by 
Antonelli. 
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eign Minister about the security of the Papal States, the situation in 
Paris was worsening. The Prussian armies were getting closer. 
The great fear was the Crown Prince Frederick's Southern Army 
would bypass the French forces (then raggedly backing off to the Bel-
gian frontier) and directly invest Paris without opposition. No mat-
ter how it was to be done, an attack on Paris was a definite possibil-
ity, and in that case, Chigi's greatest responsibility would be to 
maintain contact with Rome. It was a nervous prospect which faced 
all the members of the Diplomatic Corps. Towards the end of the 
month, Chigi was beginning to take steps aimed at collective action 
by all the ambassadors to keep the diplomatic channels open. His 
position as dean came into full play in this episode. 18 
On August 31, Chigi hosted a meeting of diplomats at the nun-
ciature where they discussed their difficulties. Evidently the am-
bassadors did not realize the lateness of the hour as two days later 
' 
came the French defeat at Sedan. The news did not arrive in Paris 
until September 3, and sometime during that day, Chigi telegraphed 
to Rome: 
The Emperor has voluntarily gone from Sedan 
to offer himself to the King of Prussia. MacMahon 
not wishing to subscribe to the surrender has with-
18Rapp 1657, August 30, 1870 and Rapp 1658, September 2, 
1870, both in ASV, Se gr di St, A 1871, R 242, f 1, fols. 169-71 and 
184-85. 
, 
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drawn forty thousand men along with Wimspffen . 
. . • His Majesty has been conducted safely, going 
to Belgium. 
On September 4, Chigi wired: 
The Republic is proclaimed. Provisional 
government installed without any opposition. All 
is quiet. Prussians march unhindered toward Paris. 
Diplomatic Corps undecided on whether to leave or 
stay. As for myself, I await the orders of Your 
Eminence. 19 
The rapidity with which event followed event in those early 
days of September of 1870 is one of the most chronicled episodes in 
French history. The above telegrams, reproduced in their entirety, 
are Chigi's only testimony as a witness to the tumultuous changes. 
There is no other way to detect where he was each day, with whom 
he conferred, how and when he heard about Sedan, whether he saw 
any government officials, or if he personally saw such things as the 
frenzied Chamber meetings or the various street scenes. This lack 
of detail is in marked contrast left by such individuals as Metternich, 
Nigra, Lord Lyons, and the American minister Washburne. 20 
19 All three telegrams in ASV, loc. cit., fols. 180, 176, and 
182. 
20Metternich and Nigra were with Empress Eug~nie in her 
last desperate hours at the Tuileries and aided her in her escape. 
Lord Lyons had just returned from the front where he had unsuccess-
fully tried to see the Emperor. Washburne gives vivid eye-witness 
accounts of the Chamber meetings, the proclamation of the Republic 
at the Hotel de Ville, and the street demonstrations in Volume I of 
his Recollections of a Minister to France (New York, 1887). 
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Only on September 6, at a time when he had more opportunity 
to assess the situation, did Chigi pen a report to Antonelli. He re-
ferred to the developments of the last several days as a "military 
and civil catastrophe." He expressed surprise and some sorrow at 
the humiliating manner in which Napoleon III had surrendered to the 
Prussians, as this action had played the major role in bringing down 
the Empire. Chigi also wondered how it was possible that such a 
small group of politicians in the Chambers could proclaim a repub-
lie. Even though a republic was the new order of the day, it did not 
inspire much confidence or sympathy. Talk was already heard of 
either an Orleanist or a Bourbon being offered the throne. For the 
moment, the new government was to defer important questions of 
internal political matte rs and foreign relations. concentrating instead 
on the menace of the Prussians. The government was determined 
to resist Prussia to the last, but competent individuals doubted that 
this resistance would be worthwhile or victorious, given the sad 
21 
condition of the Army. 
By mentioning deferred action on constitutional quest ions, 
the resolve to continue the war, the overwhelming Prussian threat, 
21 
Rapp 1660, September 6 11 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 198-
200. The description of the immediate dilemma of the new Repub-
lic represents one of Chigi's better, if rarely correct, assessments 
of French politics. 
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<; 
' r and the immediate appearance of monarchist solutions, Chigi des -
cribed in a nutshell the essential problems of the Third Republic which 
were to plague its entire life. 
r 
CHAPTER IV 
THE FALL OF THE TEMPORAL POWER AND THE 
PR OB LE MS OF THE SIEGE OF 
PARIS 
The disappearance of the Second Empire did not spell an end 
of troubles for Flavia Chigi. Rather, it served to open a Pandora's 
box of agitation, a lost cause, and eight months of exile. Trouble 
enough it was for Chigi to have to face difficulties in Paris, but he 
also had to do what was possible to stave off the threat besetting far-
aw<3;y Rome. 
Towards the end of August, Chigi had become quite aware 
that the Prussians were pouring into France at a rapid pace. When 
French inability to stop the invasion became apparent long before 
Sedan, all Paris expected an attack or siege on the city. The Diplo-
matic Corps knew that it could not escape any of the dangers in cum -
bent with such an eventuality, so they began to make preparatio:;:is. 
The various ambassadors were split on what course to follow. 
Some suggested that they should all go to French Army headquarters 
so as to be near the Emperor and avoid being shut up in Paris. Lord 
Lyons was the particular proponent of this action, but Chigi thought 
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it impractical as the French were not about to allow foreign agents 
into their precincts. Lord Lyons himself found this out when he 
tried to visit Napoleon III at the front. 
An alternative was being pushed by Prince Metternich. He 
suggested continual contact among the various diplomats and minis -
ters so that collective action could be pursued. A series of meet-
ings toward that goal was begun at the end of August. In the mean-
time, the diplomats decided to stay in Paris. La Tour d'Auvergne 
told Chigi on August 29 that the Empress was firmly determined to 
maintain residence at the Tuileries, come what may. The Diplo-
matic Corps thus decided to remain close to the Regent government. 
As Chigi wrote all this information to Rome, he reminded 
Antonelli of the "immense difficulty" which could lie ahead i£ Paris 
were besieged. With an interruption of communication with Rome 
so likely, Chigi pledged to use every means of contact possible, 
whether telegraph or railway i£ necessary. Nonetheless, Chigi 
1 
begged Antonelli to send explicit instructions. 
Before these instructions arrived, Chigi went ahead with 
conferring with the other foreign representatives. The first meet-
ing was held at the ninciature on the afternoon of Wednesday, August 
1Rapp 1657, August 30, 1870, ASV, Seg di St, A 1871, R 
242, fl, fols. 169-71 and Rapp 1655, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, 
R 165, f 3, fols. 96-97. 
r 
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31. It was previously agreed that the meeting would be of the most 
casual and informal nature so as to allow free discussion and to avoid 
any public image of panic. Only full-ranked ambassadors were 
present. 
Those attending were unanimous in thinking that freedom of 
action was of the utmost necessity, yet this freedom was dependent 
upon what the French government would do in case of siege. Much 
discussion went into what the diplomatic community would do if the 
French civil government should largely transfer itself out of Paris 
and leave the city in the control of a military tribunal. The official 
status of the Diplomatic Corps would be very uncertain if it were left 
under the authority of the Army. Finding out the government's plans 
was the urgent task of the moment, and each ambassador pledged to 
2 
ascertain this information from the Foreign Minister. 
The battle of Sedan and the collapse of the Second Empire 
rendered such inquiries academic. The fate of Paris became as 
obvious as the rising of the sun. Full-scale flight from the city by 
2Rapp 1658, September 2, 1870, ASV Segr di St, Anno 1871, 
R 242, f l» fols. 184-185. 
Chigi does not name those who took part in the meeting, but 
it can safely be assumed that Lyons, Metternich, and the Spanish 
and Russian ambassadors were in attendance. Nigra was likely 
not present as he would have been persona non grata at a papal nun-
ciature. 
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many citizens and officials began immediately. Chigi found it vital 
to see the Foreign Minister, but he was not able to get to the Quai 
d 10rsay until September 8, six days after Sedan and four days after 
the proclamation of the Republic. There was yet another Foreign 
Minister by now, Jules Favre ( 1809-1880), with whom Chigi would 
have many negotiations in the days and months ahead. Despite the 
fact that France had practically lost the war and the Prussians were 
knocking at the gates of Paris, Favre found the time to receive the 
nuncio just as he had been able to grant interviews to Lyons and 
Metternich earlier. 
Chigi told Favre that he came in what was really an unoffi-
cial capacity because the Holy See had not extended recognition to 
the ,new Republic. The nuncio was concerned mostly about the fate 
of the personnel and archives of the nunciature now that the Prus -
sians were on their way. Favre gave his best assurances that the 
Government of National Defense (the official title the provisional 
government had given itself) would do its best to protect all foreign-
ers and their property. 
Chigi then asked if the foreign representatives in Paris would 
be able to maintain contact with their home governments-. Favre 
said it was his desire to see the entire Diplomatic Corps kept to-
gethe r outside the capital since Paris would be surrounded in a few 
days. The advantage would be to make use of the ambassadors in 
-81-
pos si.ble peace negotiations. Favre painted a horrifying picture of 
a bombarded city i.n which many innocent victims would suffer. 
Surely such a spectacle would make the ambassadors do what they 
could to work for a settlement of the war. 
Then the conversation turned to the inevitable topic of the 
safety of the Temporal Power. With acute embarrassment, Favre 
showed Chi.gi a dispatch he had received from Florence. The Ital-
ian government had decided to invade the Papal States and take Rome. 
Without allowing the nuncio to say anything, Favre tried to impress 
on Chi.gi. the improbability of France coming to the aid of the Holy 
See in repelling the invasion. There was simply nothing that could 
be done. Favre then became quite emotional and personable at this 
poi.p.t. He hoped to convince Chi.gi that although his personal con-
victi.ons were in favor of the Sovereign Ponti.ff and France fully 
understood what the Holy See was suffering, the Eldest Daughter of 
the Church was powerless. Chigi. had no response to this. 
Favre asked Chi.gi if he knew whether the Pope would leave 
Rome should Victor Emmanuel's troops enter the city. Chigi said 
he had no way of knowing what Pi.us IX 1s intentions were and that he 
hesitated to speak on this question for fear of misquoting his super-
3 
ior or giving mistaken impressions. 
3 The description of the conference with Favre is entirely 
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Chigi had ceased to make overt efforts to secure French aid 
for Rome since his interview with Napoleon III on July 25. His 
conduct was little different in this meeting with Favre. He did not 
pound the table, he did not remind France of her sacred duty, he did 
not threaten ecclesiastical punishment; the hour was past for all of 
that. He merely acquiesced. Now that Italy had crossed the Papal 
frontier, the handwriting was on the wall. Chigi evidently agreed 
with Favre that France could do nothing. Chigi would not see Favre 
or any other French official until after the 20th of September, the 
day the Italian army captured Rome. The end of the Temporal 
Power was in sight, and Chigi apparently accepted that fate. 
The instructions which Chigi had requested earlier arrived 
on September 1 I. Antonelli said that Chigi should follow the ex-
ample of the British ambassador in deciding whether to remain in 
Paris or leave. This suggestion was given in good faith, Chigi 
wrote back the next day, but most of the diplomats had decided by 
now that they would act in the best manner they saw fit regardless 
of instructions from home governments. For himself, Chigh thought 
that it was best to stay on at Paris for as long as possible. The in-
terest of the Vatican would be better served by his presence in the 
contained in one dispatch, Rapp 1661, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 204-
205. 
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capital. Also, Chigi thought he might have a hand in mediating peace 
d P . 4 between France an russ1a. 
On the matter of what could be done to save the Temporal 
Power, Chigi could only formulate theories. If France yet sue-
ceeded in stopping the Prussians, then she would come to the Pope's 
aid. Perhaps the French would be persuaded that the September 
Convention, being an international treaty, its validity continued un-
der the new regime. Chigi could not imagine that the Catholic and 
Imperialist sentiments of some members of the new government 
could not favorably be appealed to. All these factors were ridicu-
lously tenuous, Chigi knew, and he told Antonelli on September 15 
that he could not put into words the desolation and sorrow that the 
news of the continued invasion of the Papal States caused in him. 
There was no hope· now for any comfort or consolation for the op-
5 pres si~:>n of the Holy See. 
4Antonelli to Chigi, #56166, September 6, 1870, ASV, ANP, 
1869-70 and Rapp 1662, September 12, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 
1871, R 242, f 1, fols. 206-207. 
5Rapp 1662, September 12, 1870 and Rapp 1663, September 
15, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols 201-202. 
In Rapp 1663, Chigi made a number of other comments worth 
mentioning. He saw "no possibility of success for the mission of 
Signore Thie rs. 11 Chigi described an incident of a mob attack on 
the Jesuit seminary in Rue Vaugirard in Paris and told of Interior 
Minister Jules Simon's warning to Archbishop Darboy of Paris of 
the difficulty the government might have in protecting Church pro-
perties -- a foretaste of the Commune. Finally, Chigi expressed 
-84-
On September 20, 1870, forces of the Italian government 
under General Cadorna entered the city of Rome after token resist-
ance and put an end to the Temporal Power of the Roman Catholic 
pontiffs. The last dramatic act of the Risorgimento was played out, 
and Italy now had her historic capital. Pius IX remained in the halls 
of the Vatican Palace in unshakeable defiance of the new order and 
began the long, self-imposed seclusion of himself and subsequent 
popes whereby the Catholic pontiffs became known as "The Prisoner 
of the Vatican. " 
Chigi was given this grave news by Favre who presented him 
with a telegram received at the Foreign Ministry which read: 
After several volleys of cannon and a treaty of 
capitulation, the Italians have occupied Rome. The 
Holy Father has not left the city. 
The same day Antonelli sent his own notification to Chigi and asked 
him to round up support for the cause of the Holy See. Chigi did 
. 
this and said he talked with General Trochu (the military governor 
of Paris and nominal head of the Government of National Defense), 
Favre, Lord Lyons, and Prince Metternich. All said they deplored 
the action of Italy but were powerless to do anything. 6 
the hope that the French constitutional assembly, when elected, would 
be composed of "good Catholics." 
6 Rapp 1665, September 27, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 212-
213 and undated note in ASV, ANP, 1860-70. 
r 
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For himself, Chigi could only say that he was very sorry and 
make some references to the "iniquity and the stealth of the horrible 
government of Italy." He renewed his pledge of loyalty to the Holy 
Father and told Antonelli that he would continue to follow all his 
orders. There was little else to be done. Action on the Roman 
Question would have to be put off. Chigi now devoted his full atten-
tion to the question of what the Diplomatic Corps was to do in a city 
. 7 
under siege. 
After Sedan, the Prussians advanced virtually unhindered to 
Paris and began the siege on September 19. Large numbers of 
French government officials had previously gone to Tours to estab-
lish some sort of center of authority which could keep in touch with 
the rest of the country. Important officials such as Favre and Trochu 
remained in Paris. The ambassadors of England, Russia, Austria, 
Italy, and Turkey left the city soon after the siege began. Chigi was 
the only full ambassador left in the capital. There also remained 
the American minister Elihu Washburne (1816-1887), who was hand-
ling Prussian affairs in France, and an assortment of other ministers, 
charges d'affaires, and consuls from smaller European and Latin 
American nations. The difficulty was at hand of being able to com-
7Personal letter to Antonelli in Chigh's hand, September 26, 
1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 242, f 1, Fols. 208-211. 
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municate with home governments, and under Chigi 's leadership as 
dean of the corps, the emissaries took steps to alleviate their situa-
tion. 
A second meeting of diplomatic agents took place at the nun-
ciature on Friday, September 23. With the siege now in full force, 
Chigi told his guests that perhaps their position was useless since 
they could not send out dispatches. General discontent was ex-
pressed that Lyons, Metternich and the others had left without 
informing anyone and in violation of the agreement to hang together. 
The problems as Chigi saw them were: when would be the proper 
time to leave Paris, should the diplomats act separately or together, 
and what steps might be taken to establish lines of communication. 
Several ministers spoke their minds. The Swiss minister Kern 
thought that the C0rps should not leave until an official notice of 
bomba.rdment had been given, as was the usual procedure according 
to international law. Kern suggested that Chigi should be entrusted 
to go to Favre in the name of all the diplomats and request from him 
what information he had. Favre was to submit to the Prussian 
military headquarters two points: ( 1) that the Diplomatic Corps be 
allowed a weekly courier service to leave Paris, and (2) that the 
Prussians would serve adequate notice beforehand of shelling of the 
city. Hopeless as it might seem to obtain these conditions, Chigi 
assented to the mission and promised to reconvene the gathering 
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when he had achieved any results. 8 
Chigi got in touch with Favre immediately who promised to 
forward the message to Bismarck when he would see the Chancellor 
at Ferrieres. Favre also said that France was very grateful that 
the various envoys had decided to stay on at Paris despite the cruel 
circumstances in which they all had found themselves, 
Bismarck's reply, which came on September 26, was hardly 
comforting. He said he regretted that military considerations 
would not allow him to divulge any plans or projects concerning at-
tacks to be made against the city. He was, however, disposed to 
allow the weekly courier service provided that all correspondence 
was left unsealed and contained nothing pertaining to military af-
9 
fairs. 
Chigi received this message through Favre on October 3 and 
called a third meeting at the nunciature the next day. In regard to 
Bismarck's answer on the request for a bombardment notice, Chigi 
said it was evasive. The conditions Bismarck attached to the send-
ing of dispatches rendered it impossible for the Diplomatic Corps 
8Rapp 1666, October 3, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 42-43 
and Washburne, Vol. I, pp. 127-128. 
9Favre to Chigi, September 24, 1870; Bismarck to Favre, 
September 26, 1870, and Favre to Chigi, October 3, 1870, ASV, 
loc. cit., fols. 19, 23, and 25. 
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to avail themselves to the Chancellor's offer. All the envoys pre-
sent agreed. Some discussion ensued on whether diplomats actually 
had the right to be notified of bombardment (Kern assured them they 
did) and to the outrage felt at having to send dispatches unsealed 
subject to the inspection of a foreign power. Kern again took the 
initiative and suggested that the diplomats themselves correspond 
directly with Bismarck and tell him they rejected his statement. 
Their cause might be better presented than Favre had been able to 
do. A committee of Chigi, Washburne, Kern, and the Dutch min-
10 
ister Baron de Nyeveldt was appointed to draw up the letter, 
The letter to Bismarck was composed and signed on October 
6. Fifteen names were affixed to it, the first being Chigi 's. The 
letter made reference to the message previously sent by Bismarck 
indicating that dispatches would have to be left open. The diplomats 
said t~ey wanted to live up to their duties as foreign agents in a 
capital under siege, but as diplomatic agents they could not fulfill 
their roles under a condition of open dispatches. If this restriction 
was imposed they could not act as representatives of neutral powers 
lORapp 1667, October 23, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 15-
18 and Washburne, 1, pp. 159-62. Rapp 1667, written several 
weeks after all this happened, was the first dispatch Chigi wrote to 
Rome after his arrival in Tours. 
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h . 1 11 and report to t eir governments proper y. 
An uncompromising reply came from Bismarck on October 
10. Since the Prussian Foreign Minister Baron von Thiele had 
given official notice to foreign governments on September 26 that 
Paris was in a state of siege and that the freedom of movement of 
diplomatic agents therein was subject to the military situation, Bis-
marck could only comply with this ruling. The military situation 
controlled everything, and Bismarck thought that international law 
was on his side in demanding that all correspondence be left open. 
The French government had itself decided to hold Paris, and their 
decision had made Paris a fortress under siege. The diplomats 
who had chosen to remain with the government to which they were 
accredited would have to suffer the inconvenience of being in a 
sieged fortress, a·nd the Prussian government could not be respon-
sible ~or any consequences. 
11Diplomatic Corps in Paris to Count von Bismarck, ASV, 
loc. cit., fol. 10 and Washburne, I, pp. 161-162. -
The diplomats who signed the letter were the following~ 
Chigi, ~ern, Washburne, Baron de Nyeveldt, Baron Adelswaerd 
--minister of Sweden and Norway, Count de Moltke-Huitfeldt--
minister of Denmark, Baron Beyens --minister of Belgium, 
Lopez de Arosemena--secretary of legations for Honduras and 
Salvador, Ratton--charge d'affaires of Brazil, Viscount de Las-
castre~-charge d 1affaires for Portugal, Duke d 'Acquaviva- -charge 
d'affaires of Monaco and San Marino, Martin--charge"d'affaires 
of Hawaii, Thirion--charge d'affairs from the Dominican Republic, 
de Ballivian y Roxas--Bolivian minister, and Galvez--minister of 
Peru. 
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This was entirely a new situation, Bismarck continued 0 A 
national government at war with a power with which it had severed 
diplomatic relations had shut itself up in its capital and foreign dip-
lomats with it. Such a set of circumstances was without parallel 
in modern times, and it was rather difficult to determine what inter-
national law said. Bismarck closed by saying that the envoys were 
still able to communicate with him and King William, but in the end, 
the diplomats had only the Government of National Defense to blame 
12 
for their problems. 
The persistent obstinacy shown by the Prussian Chancellor 
seems to have been the last straw for Chigi. He decided the time 
had come to leave Paris. He made this decision feeling that it was 
necessary to be in touch with Rome and with the rest of France as 
well. To leave Paris would provide him the liberty to receive 
instructions from Antonelli and to be able to carry them out. Also 
there was the need to counter any influence Nigra, the Italian am-
bassador, might have at Tours. The needs of Rome could be better 
13 
pleaded at Tours. 
Accordingly, Chigi petitioned Favre to obtain a pass from 
12 Bismarck to Chigi, October 10, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., 
fols. 12-13. 
13 
Rapp 1667, October 23, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 15-18. 
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' 
Bismarck through the Prussian lines, which Favre did with no 
trouble. Chigi hoisted the papal flag over the nunciature, sealed 
and hid the nunciature files, and left the building and papal citizens 
under the protection of one M. Haugel. The nuncio left Paris on 
' October 10 by way of the Porte de Sevres, the western gateway out 
14 
of the city. 
Instead of heading directly for Tours, some 145 miles to the 
west, as one might expect, Chigi made a surprising two-day stop at 
Versailles, which was now the military headquarters of the Prus-
sian forces. There he asked for and received an astounding audi-
ence with the full array of the denizens of Prussian power: King 
William, Crown Prince Frederick, Count von Bismarck, and Gen-
era.Ivon Moltke. Chigi's motive was predictable. He told the 
Prussian rulers that he wished "to call their attention to the sacri-
legious invasion of Rome and to call upon the support of their offices 
so that justice would be done to the rights of the Holy Father." 
Though Prussia was now pre-occupied with the war, perhaps a time 
and a place could be established in which a declaration of Prussian 
support would come forth. 
After this statement, Chigi got principle responses from 
14Ibid. Attempts to identify this M. Haugel were unsuc -
cessful. 
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Prince Frederick and Bismarck. The Crown Prince spoke of com-
promise, saying that the possibility existed of finding a middle ground 
between the privileges of the Holy See and the action of the Italian 
government. He expounded a number of reasons and answers for 
demonstrating that the fall of the Temporal Power of the Holy See 
and the establishment of another sovereignty in Rome would not weak-
en the independence and liberty of exercise of the Pope's spiritual 
power. Therefore the opposition emanating from Rome to the idea 
of dealing directly with Victor Emmanuel's government had no reason 
to exist. 
Not wanting to hear this kind of advice, Chigi pointed out to 
the Crown Prince the fragile nature of his suggestions, saying fur-
theT that they did not take into account in any manner the expectations 
and inalienable rights of the Holy Father in this matter now called 
the Roman Question. Chigi's response was typical of any Vatican 
representative! staunch opposition to any suggestion of a solution 
which fell short of recognizing the Temporal Power. 
Bismarck spoke next, giving a statement which tended to re -
fleet more official Prussian policy than Frederick's informal remarks. 
The government of Berlin regretted what had happened to the Tem-
poral Power but simply was not in the same position as the Catholic 
states. Prussia could not take the same interest as Austria, for 
example, which was situated geographically closer to the Italian 
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peninsula and was of necessity more concerned than Prussia could 
be. Prussia would pursue a policy unhampered by the other powers. 
At the conclusion of the interview, the Prussian officials 
begged Chigi to lay their respects before the Holy Father and to con-
vey their respects to Cardinal Antonelli. 15 
With his mission in Versailles an evident failure, Chigi saw 
15Rapp 1670, October 27, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 110-
113. 
This rapporto contains the only reference the author could 
find to this interview. Dr. Mortiz Busch's Le Comte de Bismarck 
et Sa Suite pendant la guerre de France (Paris, 1879), p. 176 in-
dicates that Chigi was in Versailles on or about Octo~er 16, and 
had an interview with Bismarck, but does not describe the inter-
view proper. 
Bismarck's own published writings and memoirs likewise 
contain little or nothing about this meeting. His The Memoirs 
(Ne.w York, reprinted 1966), II, Ch. XXIII, titled "Versailles", 
says nothing. Ch. XXIV, titled "Culturcampf", describes negoti-
ations in mid-October, 1870 with Archbishop Ledochowski of Posen 
and Bonnechose, Cardinal Archbishop of Rauen, in which the two 
prelates tried (as Chigi had) to get Prussian support for the plight 
of the Holy See. Bismarck's Lettres a sa femme pendant la 
guerre de 1870-71 (Paris, 1903) makes no reference to the meet-
ing. 
The French Foreign Ministry Archives contain no mention 
of the meeting. The Vatican Archives contain only Chigi 1s Rapp 
1670 and a follow-up note from Antonelli thanking him for his ef-
forts, indicating that Chigi acted on his own in seeing the Prussians. 
The only other place where this meeting could be further 
explored would be Prussian and German archives. Given the in-
finitesimal significance of this meeting in the whole picture of the 
Franco-Prussian war, the conduct of German foreign policy later, 
the career of Bismarck, etc., plus the fact that the author does 
not read German, renders any further pursuit of documentation on 
Chigi's confrontation with the Prussians meaningless. 
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little reason to stay on any longer. He left and arrived in Tours on 
October 21, 1870 to begin an exile with a wandering government which 
would last into the following spring. 
July through October of 1870 had been a turbulent four months 
for Archbishop Flavio Chigi. In a sense, his entire world had col-
lapsed: an emperor he had respected was deposed, a government he 
favored vanished, a pope he served had been humiliated, a comfort-
able diplomatic existence he had known was abruptly rent from hi.m. 
A bad ti.me it was, though Chigi cannot be faulted for bringing all 
these things about. If i.t is not a question of Cpigi causing all his 
own troubles, what should be examined are his reactions to these 
events. 
Chigi could easily have become maudlin and sullen once the 
Second Empire evaporated. The evidence is that he was undaunted. 
A new government was in, and it did not matter that the form of that 
government was of questionable acceptability to the Vatican. Thus 
Chigi immediately began to deal with Favre even though Favre was 
a Protestant and the government was a republic. Chigi was a dip-
lomat and was in no position to attempt to mold French politics, at 
least not when the war was going so badly. 
If the Second Empire was to disappear without so much as a 
shrug from Chigi, the loss of the Temporal Power was another mat-
ter. Chigi did feel the papal tragedy in a deeply personal way and 
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admitted as much to Antonelli with many references to sorrow, pain, 
disgust, desolation, and so on. Such expressions are not often found 
in diplomatic correspondence. 
Chigi 's interior feelings notwithstanding, the foremost ques -
tion is, can it be said that the nuncio failed? Looking solely at the 
evidence, such as the withdrawal of the French garrison in late July, 
the delinquency of Chigi in not working night and day to get the French 
to return to Rome, and the entry of Italian troops into the Eternal 
City on September 20, the answer to this question would have to be a 
resounding "yes." Yet because Chigi cannot be blamed personally 
for all these things, the ineffectiveness of his mission lies elsewhere. 
In examining Chigi 's role over the long run, that is, going 
back to 1862, it is clear that the nuncio had not labored enough to 
better relations between Paris and Rome. He had held the Paris 
nunciature at critical junctions in Vatican-French relations (the 
September Convention, Mentana, the Vatican Council), but he lacked 
either the courage or the finesse to use these and other opportunities 
to shore up relations between Paris and Rome. For Chigi to be as -
signed to the court of Napoleon III for eight years and still suffer 
the ignominy of being told ex post facto about the troop removal indi-
cates an immense shortcoming in Chigi in not establishing himself 
in diplomatic circles or gaining the trust of officials of the Second 
Empire. 
r 
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Chigi's continual squabbles with Napoleon III over such mat-
ters as writing letters to bishops and other violations of diplomatic 
courtesy did not better relations and should have been cause for his 
recall. 
When the end of the Temporal Power came in sight, Chigi 
had no one to turn to in France, neither the Empress, conservative 
lay Catholics, or the French episcopate. Chigi could argue voci-
ferously with Napoleon III and Gramont in the audience of July 25, 
but that was the end of it. It is small wonder that for the next two 
months Chigi did almost nothing to protect the safety of Rome and 
the Pope. 
Flavio Chigi was the product of a thoroughly traditional Roman 
Catholic indoctrination. This put him into several traps from which 
he could not emerge. One was that he represented the usual seen 
in most Vatican officials at the time: hard-headedness and lack of 
imagination. The pope was right, those who had other opinions 
were wrong. France must protect the pope, it was her sacred duty. 
France's diplomatic services to help the pope in other ways could 
not be utilized. The pope must have the Temporal Power, no doubts 
about this could be entertained. Chigi refused to listen to talk of 
compromise as voiced by Gramont in late July and by Crown Prince 
Frederick in October. 
Chigi was little different from his masters in Rome when it 
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came to the Temporal Power. If Pius IX and Antonelli were to be 
given over to their classic intransigence on the question of Papal 
Sovereignty, the nuncio in Paris could act in no other way. The 
difference for Chigi was that he was out in the field and had oppor-
tunity to maneuver and improve things. He could talk with persons 
of other viewpoints and possibly get a different perspective on the 
vi.ability of the Temporal Power. He was in a position to see how 
inconsequential the question of the independence of the Papal States 
was in the total European picture. He fell short of doing this and 
thus helped make things all the worse for both France and the Holy 
See. 
Despite Chigi's omitting to build himself a solid base through-
out, the 1860's which he could have put to use in 1870, one feature 
running through the background does offer some defense for him. 
The fact cannot be ignored that while Chigi himself seems to have 
accepted the fate of the Italian takeover of Rome, the Holy See itself 
acted little differently. Inasmuch as Chigi did not rant and rave 
and give off thunderous protests in Paris, Antonelli himself did not 
toss up a storm when the French said they were pulling out. Anton-
elli did not tell Chigi to knock on all doors or have Napoleon III ex-
communicated. Only towards the end, as September 20 came 
closer, did the Secretary of State begin to send out a few frantic 
messages. Once again, this conduct would indicate a certain fore -
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' 
taste that Rome would one day be lost and the Vatican would not be 
able to do much to prevent it. 
Chigi can be charged with fa i.lure though such a statement is 
not intended to heap the blame of September 20 on his shoulders 
alone. In his own surroundings, he could have alleviated the pre -
dicament to an extent that French influence could have been put to 
better use or compromise over the Roman Question could have been 
worked toward. 
In regard to Chigi's handling of the problems of the Diplo-
ma tic Corps in Paris, Chigi met again with failure. Here his lack 
of success can bring no censure, as his actions in trying to deal with 
awkward conditions were the best that could be hoped for. It would 
have been a Herculean task to wrangle concessions out of one such 
as Otto von Bisma-:rck, especially when he was about to put the 
stranglehold on the prize of Paris. Hardly anyone could have per-
• 
suaded the Iron Chancellor to allow sealed documents to come out 
of the capital or to announce his tactics in bombarding the city. 
Chigi did his utmost to preserve the unity of the Diplomatic 
Corps. His pride was not so great that he could not work together 
with consuls and secretaries from such places as Haiti, Peru, and 
Hawaii. When Bismarck answered negatively the first time, Chigi 
had no hesitation in going along with the other diplomats in appealing 
directly to the Prussian chancellor. 
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Chigi can be further commended on acting pragmatically by 
staying in Paris as long as he did rather than follow Antonelli 1s in-
structions or depart right away as Lyons, Metternich, and the 
others did. Finally, it was to Chigi's credit that, even though he 
represented the Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic world, it was not 
below him to co-operate with fellow envoys who themselves were 
not Catholic or who represented non-C.atholic states. 
Chigi's last venture before arriving in Tours, the audience 
with the Prussian leaders, stands out as something of a pretentious 
puzzlement. Here was a nuncio accredited to France holding nego-
tiations with Prussia·. Here was a nuncio who had recently com-
pleted a turgid exchange with Bismarck and was now trying to curry 
his. favor. Chigi revealed a considerable naivete by stating that he 
wished that the time and place could be named when Prussia would 
come to the Pope's aid. How Chigi hoped to gain such a pledge by 
.. 
making an appeal at a Prussian military headquarters in time of war 
is incomprehensible. Chigi's abject dismissal of Frederick's con-
ciliatory suggestions indicates how narrow-minded a Vatican diplo-
mat could be. The whole scene was another example of inept 
Vatican forays into the world of realpolitik. 
CHAPTER V 
THE MONTHS AT TOURS AND BOURDEAUX 
Flavio Chigi took up his own exile with the French govern-
ment in Tours on October 21, 1870. Tours, with a population of 
60, 000 at the time, was a medium-sized industrial city some 145 
miles southwest of Paris. By autumn of 1870 1 it had become the 
center of activity of the French resistance with the government now 
situated there. Refugees crowded into the city along with remnants 
of the French army and throngs of government bureaucrats. The 
diplomatic corps had trickled into the city as well. Despite Tours 1 
new stature as a t~mporary national capital, things would not be the 
same as they had in glittering Paris before the war. Chigi did not 
fit very well in this scene as the Diplomatic Corps could not function 
as it had before and because the government was so disorganized and 
preoccupied with the war. Chigi's unwanted sojourn in Tours and 
later Bourdeaux could normally be dismissed as a dull parenthesis 
had it not been for the ticklish problem of the Roman Question. 
Regardless of a dispossessed pope in Rome and a frenetic French 
government fighting a quixotic;: crusade, Chigi plugged on at keeping 
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1 
the papal needs before French eyes. 
Chi.gi.'s main contact in the Tours government was Jean-
Baptiste comte de Chaudordy (1826-1889). A career diplomat who 
was serving as first secretary of the French embassy in Madrid 
when the Hohenzollern candidacy crisis broke, Chaudordy was ap-
pointed ~elegue" for foreign affairs since Jules Favre had remained 
in Paris. Chaudordy was a loyal Catholic and monarchist, and his 
sympathies undoubtedly lay with the plight of Pius IX. Chigi saw 
fit to appeal to these sentiments but was to meet with little success, 
a failure due more to France's debilitation rather than a weakness 
of will on Chaudordy's part. 
The nuncio and the acting foreign minister held their first 
meeting on November 7, 1870, in circumstances far less formal than 
had been during the peaceful days back in Paris. The substance of 
the exc::hange was Chigi presenting a circular protest from Antonelli 
which referred to France's responsibility of supporting Pius IX 
under terms of the September Convention. Chaudordy's answer 
was curt and to the point. France had a new government, and it 
1According to one source, Chigi was lodged in Tours at the 
home of the Marquis de Mondragon. Leonce DuPont, Tours et 
Bordeaux, souvenirs de la Rtpublique ;{ Outrance (Paris, Dentu, 
1877), p. 58. DuPont further describes Chigi as being "the best 
lodged and provided for" among the diplomats in Tours, some of 
whom had to search hard for adequate shelter. 
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could not be responsible for acts and agreements made by previous 
2 
men who were either dead or out of office. 
The brief exchange was typical of several which Chigi would 
have with Chaudordy. The frigid atmosphere and the brevity of 
Chigi's descriptions resulted from the exigencies of the war-time 
state of affairs and the consequent dispensation with ceremonials. 
Specific appointments were hard to get. Formal statements of greet-
ing from the Pope were forgotten. Pledges of support of the Holy 
Father were completely unheard. The length of conferences was 
severely curtailed, even to the point that some appear to have been 
chance meetings in corridors. Ultimately, Chigi was competing 
with the Franco-Prussian War for the attention of the acting foreign 
minister. 
On November 13, Chigi had another conversation with 
Chaudordy. Chigi found that Chaudordy actually did lean toward 
supporting the papal cause, and, more importantly, Chaudordy gave 
forth with a complete report on talks he had been having with the 
Italian ambassador, Constantino Nigra. Basically Chaudordy had 
2 
Rapp 1676, November 7, 1870, ASV, A 1870, R 165, f 1, 
fols. 128-129. 
.. 
Chaudordy's correspondence is at the Archives du Ministere 
des Affaires Etrang'eres, Papiers des Agents du Minist~re des 
Affaires Etrangeres, Inventaire No. 52. There are fourteen vol-
umes which cover the years 1864-1890. These volumes contain no 
letters exchanged with Archbishop Chigi. 
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told Ni.gra of his own personal belief that what was goi.ng on in Rome 
was against the rights of the sacred person of the Holy Father. 
Nigra attributed these disturbances to the actions of returning 
Roman emigrants who had taken advantage of the situation. Surely 
the Italian government was not to blame. Chigi thought it was easy 
to see the vanity of this argument as the authors of disorder were to 
3 
be found in the Florentine government. 
The substance of this conversation may not appear to be 
very great, but a precedent was bei.ng established. Obviously, 
there was a willingness by Chaudordy to divulge this information. 
Chigi was much more eager to hear what Nigra had to say than was 
Nigra's desire to know the papal nuncio's thoughts. A small but 
necessary diplomatic chain was being linked up between Rome and 
Florence by way of Chigi, Chaudordy, and Nigra. Cumbersome 
as this roundabout path was and short-lived as it was to be, it did 
• 
prove useful to Vatican-Italian ties in that at least some exchanges 
were made even if they were of an unfriendly nature. 
Chigi learned from Chaudordy on November 29 that Nigra 
carried a response from Florence to the papal protest aga i.nst the 
seizure of the Quirinale Palace. The note was to be forwarded to 
Antonelli. Chigi took particular exception to the Italian contention 
3 Rapp 1686, November 24, 1870, loc. cit., fols. 151-152. 
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that the seizure of the Quirinale was not an act of theft because the 
palace was not a pontifical one and was therefore no different from 
the many other palaces in the city of Rome. Chigi wondered what 
Florence could be thinking in view of the popes who had lived in the 
Quirinale, the conclaves held there, the sacred congregations which 
had used it, and the various palatine cardinals who resided within 
its walls. Chaudordy further added that he had spoken to Nigra 
about Chigi's concern for the Italian government's position on allow-
ing the Vatican to keep collecting the Peter's Pence and the Holy 
See 1s right to maintain consulates. Nigra promised he would in-
quire with Florence on these matters. 4 
Chigi welcomed this approach by Chaudordy and his readi-
ness to help the Holy See by presenting Rome's case to Nigra. Chigi 
saw that Chaudordy's original aloofness of November 7 indicated not 
a lack of understanding but rather the need to make the firm impres -
. 
sion that France was utterly helpless to render direct aid to Rome. 
Aside from this, other means were definitely available, and the 
presentation of remonstrances to Nigra was one, such way. On 
December 1, Chaudordy requested Chigi to keep him fully supplied 
with documentation of acts of violence in Rome and other attempts 
at hampering the freedom and dignity of the Holy Father. Chaudordy 
4Rapp 1688, November 29, 1870, loc. cit., fols. 167-69. 
r 
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pledged that he would submit such papers directly to Nigra and would 
support the Vatican protests. 5 
These brief encounters between Chigi and Chaudordy repre -
sented a major change in Vatican tactics. After Sedan and the 20th 
of September, the time had ended for Vatican hopes of French mili-
tary aid to oust the Italians from Rome. For the moment, the best 
path lay in the strictly diplomatic way: get French statements of 
support, have the French make protests of their own, urge the 
Government of National Defense to lead the way among Catholic 
powers to abet the Pope's distress. 
Chigi did not see Chaudordy again until near the end of 1870 
because on December 10, the Government of National Defense was 
forced to make an abrupt departure from Tours since Prussian forces 
were reaching out·from Paris and could not be stopped. The gov-
ernment quickly ran off for the safety of Bourdeaux and the Atlantic 
' 
coast. The departure from Tours was more sudden than the grad-
ual withdrawal from Paris in September. Chigi had no hesitations 
about accompanying the government on this move, and he joined in 
with the continued exile. 6 
5Rapp 1689, D;ecember 1, 1870, loc. cit., fols. 161-62. 
6 A special train was outfitted by the Government of National 
Defense to carry the diplomatic corps to Bourdeaux on December 
10, 1870. Some of the distinguished envoys were forced to double 
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In an interview on December 20, Chaudordy explained to 
Chigi that the French ambassador to Florence had been recalled. 
The ostensible reason was to prevent his presence in Florence from 
interfering with the mission of Adolphe Thiers who had arrived 
there on his journey of European capitals begging for help for France. 
Chaudordy did not connect the recall to any dissatisfaction from 
Rome or that the recall was a sign of French support for the Holy 
See. Chaudordy did mention to Chigi the problem the French even-
tually would have when Italy officially transferred the capital to 
Rome and the French embassy would have to follow. The hypo-
thesis of whether this would represent an official French sanction 
of September 20th would turn into an actual crisis the following 
summer. 
7 
Another conference with Chaudordy on January 11, 1871 
produced further warm support. Chigi and Chaudordy discussed 
possible action the C;:t-tholic powers might take to aid the Pope. The 
time for protest from the Vatican was nearing an end as the world 
up in space because facilities were in short supply. Accordingly, 
Chigi had to endure the unpleasantness (undoubtedly for him) of 
sharing a compartment with Mohammed-Pasha, the Turkish am-
bassador. Dupont, p. 246. In Bourdeaux, Chigi stayed at the 
new archiepiscopal palace recently completed by Cardinal Donnet. 
Dupont, p. 226. 
7Rapp 1693, December 20, 1870, ASV, A 1870, R 165, f 1, 
fols. 190-191. 
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seemed to understand well enough by now the nature of Pius 1 plight, 
thought Chaudordy. The delegue' expressed his inclination to begin 
talks with Rome and other friendly powers on working together. To 
shore up his pledge, Chaudordy mentioned that he had spoken to 
Nigra of his discontent with the recently passed Law of Guarantees. 
Taking note of recent attempts by Beust, the Austrian foreign min-
ister, to try to bring Italy and the Holy See to the conference table, 
Chaudordy said he wanted to take part in these moves, but added 
that he would do so only with the full knowledge and cooperation of 
8 the Holy See. 
Through these various maneuvers and exchanges, Chigi. 
seems to have achieved a strong advantage. He had managed to 
ben,d the ear of a hastily-formed, distressed, and critically trun-
cated provisional government. An early abandonment and abnega -
tion of the papal cause had been slowly waxed into mild compassion. 
A France brought to her knees still had her sentiments as eldest 
daughter of the Church. Fiery protests would still emanate from 
Rome, Italy would continue it's sacrilege, France was still think-
ing more of Prussians than of priests, but a new turn in an old 
direction had been accomplished. 
8Rapp 1702, January 12, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 8, 
fols. 23 -24. 
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By January of 1871, Chaudordy's attitude was not the only 
thing that was changing in France. The Franco-Prussian War had 
run much of its course, though the protracted peace negotiations 
and their consequences still lay ahead. Post-Second Empire France 
was definitely emerging, and Chigi was keeping his ear tuned to the 
new shape, so vital to Vatican interests. With this new France 
were coming new leaders, and Chigi was soon to find that the chief 
person to reckon with in the French government was no longer to be 
the Comte de Chaudordy but Adolphe Thie rs. 
The profound changes which swept France in 1870 and 1871 
did not escape the observant eye of Archbishop Flavio Chigi. On 
the one hand was the military holocaust which came over the land, 
the. defeat of French arms, the humiliation in the field, a third of 
the nation under occupation, the capital laid to siege. Then there 
were the political changes in both form and members: the loss of 
the imperial system, new but old leaders, the uncertain republic. 
Beyond all of this, there was a change in character and outlook 
which Chigi watched constantly. Old arguments and issues such as 
plebiscites and the power of the emperor were now moribund. The 
Prussian threat looming across the Rhine so hotly debated for years 
was not an omnipresent reality. The issues now were such things 
as what had gone wrong, why had glorious France been swamped 
with such ignominy, who was responsible, and what could be done 
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to bring France out of this horror. As Frenchmen of every type 
and stamp grappled with these profundities, Chigi was ever atten-
tive because how soon and how well the Papal phoenix might rise out 
of the ashes depended so much on the manner in which the new 
France would emerge. 
As early as October of 1870, Chigi sensed a certain direction 
that the French mode of thought was drifting toward. Already the 
hope was high that the upcoming elections for the constitutional as -
sernbly would retain a majority in favor of the cause of "order and 
the Church." In every part of France, the result of the defeats and 
all the tears was an impression among Frenchmen that a sensible 
return to God was the only path of hope. A return to religion was 
a w,ay to expiate the disasters. There was no mistake in noting that 
the announcement .of the withdrawal of the French troops from the 
Papal States coincided with the first defeats suffered by French 
forces. The slap in the face of the Pope had precipitated the wrath 
of God on France. 
Chigi said he had received such sentiments from laymen of 
every opinion, not to mention ecclesiastics and members of the hier-
archy. A principal spokesman for this point of view had been none 
other than General Louis-Jules Trochu (1815-1896), nominal head 
of the Government of National Defense. Trochu had expressed such 
beliefs to Chigi in a manner "so elevated, moving, and decisive, 11 
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as would befit a person of "such political intelligence" and one so 
"profoundly Catholic." The General had begged to be placed before 
the feet of the Holy Father to implore the apostolic benediction, 
pledging his hope of a resurgence of France to its ancient strength 
and splendor to the point where France would not fail to do i.ts duty 
9 
to the Holy Father. 
Chigi 's typically boundless optimism about the extent of 
favoritism toward Rome existent in France was soon tempered by a 
closer look into the state of French politics. Where once he had 
seen devoted angels of French conservatism everywhere, he now 
saw the satanic agents of socialism and revolution lurking behind 
every tree. Writing in December, Chigi said that there existed in 
all.French cities groups of men of the most subversive tendencies. 
These men were going to take advantage of the preoccupation of the 
Government of National Defense "to bring about the triumph of their 
• 
domination. 11 Events in cities throughout France where riots had 
occurred and religious orders had been forced to close their schools 
indicated that these "acts of barbarism" were meant to stabilize 
9Rapp 1668, October 24, 1870, ASV, A 1870, R 165, f 1, 
fols. 103-06. Chigi's reference to Trochu's "political intelligence" 
represents one of the nuncio's most exemplary off-the-mark judg-
ments about French politics. 
An ironic note creeps in here in that when Chigi referred to 
France's "resurgence", he used the Italian word "risorgimento", 
a fact which probably made him cringe. 
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"the terrorism of the Socialist and Republican movement." It was 
a comfort to see that the majority of the nation was not involved in 
this movement and that this portended the "probability of a turn of 
10 
events in France favorable to order and the tradition of honor. 11 
As late as February, 1871, when France was heading toward 
internal peace with the impending election of its constitutional as -
sembly, Chigi was still sending reports to Rome on democratic and 
socialist plots to keep up the terror in the street, to seize control 
of the assembly, move the capital to Marseilles 1 give the dictator-
ship to Gambetta, and wage war against Prussia~ outrance. Chigi 
said he had no difficulty in seeing how these schemes were related 
to the activities of similar factions working outside of France. 11 
Somewhere between the Scylla of the clericals and the Charyb-
dis of the revolutionaries, the reality of French politics emerged in 
the outcome of the elections for the Constitutional Assembly held on 
February 8, 1871. With a two-thirds majority of the Assembly 
rendered to trustworthy monarchists and conservatives, Chigi 
deemed it safe to say that the Assembly was composed of men "ar-
dent for peace and order." 
lORapp 1697, December 29, 1870, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 9, 
fols. 79-81. 
11Rapp 1710, February 2, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 242, f 2, 
fols. 74-77. 
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Right now, the task facing the new Assembly concerned mat-
ters of peace and war; after that would come the crucial debates on 
what the form of government of France would be. Chigi was sur-
prised at the vitality and numbers that the Legitimatists had shown, 
a strength in their ranks which had previously gone unnoticed. Chigi 
was anxious to see how this group would work with the bloc of Orlean-
ists and other conservatives. Of the 100 or so deputies who "leaned 
toward revolution," Chigi discounted them saying they had neither 
the strength nor numbers or internal unity to put their machinations 
. 12 
into action. 
Chigi saw the li.ne of conduct of the Assembly following three 
main points. First, those who stood for order would have to pre-
sel"ve their unity, whatever the diversity of their opinions might be, 
to combat the party of disorder. Secondlyll the Assembly must put 
aside for the moment any question of the form of government and 
. 
must itself act as the government of France without becoming too 
attached to the principles of republicanism. Finally, the peace with 
Prussiall whether in terms of territorial cession or an indemnity, 
must not be allowed to bring on the ruination of France, either to 
12Rapp 1714, February 13, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 79-82. 
Chigi further noted to Antonelli that Archbishop Dupanloup had been 
elected to the Assembly, adding (perhaps facetiously) that he hoped 
Dupanloup 1s influence could be used to the advantage of the Church. 
r 
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her military defense capabi.li.ti.es or to the strength of the public 
13 
treasury. 
The first order of business the Assembly took up was the 
erection of an executive admi.nistrati.on. Chi.gi. recognized from 
the begi.nni.ng election results that the formidable veteran of French 
politics, Adolphe Thi.ers, was to be the most powerful figure i.n the 
group. The Assembly had barely held its first session when Chi.gi 
wrote that Thi.ers "would give the movement and the direction to 
the Assembly. 11 Thi.ers 1 dedication to public affairs would make it 
easier to seek solutions to the important questions at hand. Al-
ready, Chi.gh thought, Thi.ers was acting i.n the manner of a head of 
state before the power was given hi.m officially. 14 
The Constitutional Assembly di.d exactly thi.s on February 16, 
1871, after strenuous debate on the nature of Thi.ers 1 power and 
title. Chigi. saw the actions as a temporary fusion of the monar-
chi.st factions for the sake of convenient peace. Thiers, Chi.gi 
13Rapp 1715, February 17, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 84-86. 
In thi.s same dispatch, Chigi. relayed the good news that 
Guiseppi Garibaldi., the fanatic leader of the Ri.sorgimento, had 
decided not to take his seat in the new Assembly. Garibaldi had 
come to France to fight on the French side in the Franco-Prussian 
War. He had gained the status of a national hero when his unit 
captured a Prussian battle standard during a mi.nor skirmish. 
Thi.s notoriety gained him enough prominence to win a seat, but, as 
indicated, he declined the honor. 
14Rapp 1714, February 13, 1871, loc. ci.t. 
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said, wanted the full title and prerogative of President of the Repub-
lie. but was denied this because in the view of so many Legitimatists 
15 
republicanism was tantamount to socialism. 
The news of the Thie rs election was warmly greeted in Rome. 
Antonelli wrote that the influence of Thie rs in the current papal 
plight seemed ''indubitable. 11 He urged Chigi to get Thie rs to turn 
his attention toward the cause of the Holy Father, so that "the auth-
ority of his voice and his eloquence •.. would lead his country on 
that path ••. in the glorious tradition of its history. 11 France's 
whole volte face in electing the conservative Assembly was viewed 
very well in Rome. Antonelli enjoined his nuncio to use "every 
appropriate circumstance to explain the fate of the Sovereign Pontiff 
to the Chief of the Executive Power. 1116 
As regardS' Thie rs 1 attitude toward the all important Roman 
Questi?n, Chigi found from Chaudordy that the new chief executive 
had taken great care in his first days in office to investigate the state 
of relations between France and all other powers. In particular 
concerning Rome, Thiers 1 had shown himself to Chaudordy to be 
satisfactory to the interests and rights of the Holy See. This was a 
15Rapp 1715, February 17, 1871, loc. cit. 
16 Antonelli to Chigi, #1065, February 26, 1871, loc. cit .• 
fol. 83. 
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good beginning for the papal cause, but the details would be long in 
17 
working themselves out. 
A further sign of French stability began to appear during the 
month of February as various European powers began to accord 
diplomatic recognition to the nascent Republic. This recognition 
had never been extended to the Government of National Defense des -
pite the continued presence in Bourdeaux of the diplomats ace redited 
to the defunct Second Empire. Britain, Spain, Austria, and Russia 
were among the first to have their representatives present creden-
18 
tials to Thie rs, followed by Italy toward the end of the month. 
The Holy See was rather slow in taking this defini.ti.ve step. 
One reason for this was the government of the Holy Father had all 
the. doubts in the world about recognizing a republic, although this 
factor is negligible in Chigi 1s correspondence. More important 
was whether France on its part would name an ambassador to the 
. 
Holy See. The previous ambassador, the Marquis de Banneville, 
had resigned in September of 1870 upon the abdication of Napoleon 
III, in accordance with diplomatic courtesy which requires such 
action when a head of state leaves office for whatever reason. From 
17 
Rapp 1715, February 17, 1871, loc. cit. 
18 Rapp 1716, February 22, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 8, 
fols. 39-42. 
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September on, the French embassy in Rome was under the direction 
of the charg~ d'affaires. 
The situation for foreign powers to have diplomatic relations 
with the Holy See was made very delicate since the seizure of Rome 
by the Florentine government. Foreseeing the inevitability of 
transfer of the Italian capital to Rome, European governments pon-
dered if they should have one representative in Rome for both 
Victor Emmanuel and Pius IX or if the old system would continue. 
The naming of a French representative to Pius IX with the full rank 
of ambassador would be a victory for the Vatican. 
France herself began to name ambassadors to the major 
courts of Europe as these other states sent their recognitions to 
Bordeaux. By late February, French diplomats had been dispatch-
ed to London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Madrid. Chigi tele -
graphed this information to Rome, noting that what was missing was 
the appointment to the Holy See. Disturbed by this, Chigh pres-
sured Chaudordy as to the reason. Chaudordy gave assurances of 
the firm intention of the French government to make such an appoint-
ment, but that the delay was caused by an inability to find the right 
person for the part. At the present, the Due de Corcelles was the 
prime candidate. Chigi asked Rome what it thought about having de 
Corcelles named, and Antonelli replied that "so distinguished and 
r 
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Catholic a man [as de Cordelles] would be most acceptable." 19 
Chigi had been anxious for some time to see the new Chief of 
the Executive Power. This had been denied him although other dip-
lomats in Bourdeaux had conferred with Thiers. Chigi seemed to 
think that his inability to get an appointment was due largely to 
Thie rs 1 repeated absences from Bordeaux in connection with the 
peace negotiations. 2° Chigi finally visited with Thie rs on March 
10, 1871. 
The audience was formal in nature and was reminiscent of 
the meetings Chigi had held with Napoleon III. Chigi opened the 
discussion with official salutations from Pius IX on the occasion of 
Thie rs 1 election. Then he set out to press three main points. 
First he wanted to call Thie rs 1 attention to the "indignant and intol-
erable" state to w.hich the Holy Father had been reduced by the Ital-
ian government. Second, Chigi touched on the urgency of France 
appointing to the Holy See a person who would be "the symbol of the 
Catholic intentions of France" and one who would represent the 
majority found in the Assembly. In the third place, Chigi spoke to 
Thiers of his hope to regulate the life of the Church in France, say-
19 Rapp 1716, February 22, 1871, loc. cit. and Antonelli to 
Chigi, #1103, March4, 1871, loc. cit., fol. 43. 
20 
Rapp 1718, Marc-h 2, 1871, ASV, A 1871~ R 165, f 9, fol. 
91. 
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ing that a good place to start was in the filling of vacant sees. 
Thiers replied very cautiously to Chigi's talk of the gravity 
of the Holy See's troubles. Chigi seemed to think that Thie rs was 
somewhat indifferent and simply did not comprehend the enormous 
dangers facing the pope. Thiers merely made some references to 
the limits of power of his office which prevented him from any great 
enthusiasm for supporting a foreign monarch. 
On the matter of appointing an ambassador to Rome, Thie rs 
said he was indeed at work on this business, but the greatest con-
sideration was that he hoped to find an individual who was agreeable 
to the pope. Thiers thus reaffirmed what Chigi had heard earlier 
that the delay in naming some one to Rome was caused by the inabil-
ity •to pick the right man. 
In closing his description of this meeting, Chigi confided to 
Anton~lli his personal impression of Thiers saying that in all his 
speeches and writings, Thie rs worked with the intention of avoiding 
any definite opinion and of avoiding solutions of all questions, leav-
21 
ing them hanging for the future. " 
21 Rapp 1721, March 10, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 84-87. 
Chigi and Thie rs did discuss Chigi 's third point about nam-
ing bishops to vacant sees in a vague and inconclusive manner. The 
particulars mulled over by the two men will be treated later. 
The private papers of Adolphe Thiers are scattered in sev-
eral locations in Paris: at the Biblioth~que Nationale, at the Foreign 
Ministry .A,.rchives, and at the Biblioth'eque Thie rs. The documents 
r 
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For its part, the Holy See slowly got around to sending the 
credentials for its nuncio to France although Chigi had requested 
them in mid-February. By mid-March, Chigi wrote to Rome that 
inasmuch as the other powers had afforded their recognition to the 
new regime, any further delay might offend Thiers. Antonelli 
yielded to this request although the French had still not settled on 
who the ambassador to Rome would be. Chigi received the proper 
credential papers on March 25 and immediately requested an audi-
r 
22 
ence with Thie rs which was granted him for March 30. 
By this time, another sign of France's increasing stability 
had appeared on March 10 with the removal of the government from 
its provincial stopping place in Bourdeaux back to the more perman-
ent location of Versailles. Thus» the presentation of credentials 
took place there. · 
The mood was very different from the time Chigi had pre -
sented his credentials to Napoleon III more than nine years earlier. 
consulted by this author in the AMAE proved to be useless. The 
Biblioth~que Thiers was closed for unexplained reasons during the 
author's stay in Paris in the fall of 1971. 
Given the previously noted paucity of documents in French 
Archives on Chigi, it was deemed that gaining entrance to the 
Biblioth~que Thiers would probably have been futile. 
22 
Rapp 1723, March 12 1 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 242, f 2, fols. 
133-134 and Rapp 1727, March 25, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 162, f 8, 
fols. 60-61. 
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France was depleted. There was no ride in a state coach for Chigi. 
There was no full court assembled. Chigi himself remarked later 
that the form was one of complete privacy. Thiers attempted to 
express his "extensive loyalty" to the Holy Father but hastened to 
add that the notorious state of affairs in France rendered her power-
less to respond to the expectations of His Holiness. Thiers then 
gave some information that Chigi was elated to hear. The new am-
bassador to the Holy See had been named, and he was Bernard-
Hippolyte-Marie, Comte d'Harcourt (1821-1912). Although this 
was good news to the nuncio, there was a catch. France had also 
named an ambassador to Italy, Eugene-Antoine-Horace, Comte de 
Choiseul (1837-1915). Thie rs explained that this was necessary to 
do ~s France had every reason to maintain good relations with Italy 
as well. Realizing the sensitivity of Rome on this matter, Thie rs 
explained that as much thought and effort had gone in naming Choi-
seul as naming Harcourt, with the hope that both men, found to be 
extremely capable for the delicate missions entrusted to themi would 
be acceptable to the Vatican. 
Chigi then stated that if there were insuperable roadblocks 
to France giving the Pope a complete remedy, what would France 
think or do if some of the other powers of Europe, viz. Bavaria, 
Austria, and possibly Prussia would resort to concerted action to 
protect the Pope? Thie rs answered that he was totally unaware of 
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any such plans being in the wind and that at any rate France would 
not surrender to those other powers the right of protecting the Holy 
Father which she had traditionally held. 
For a closing remark, Thiers expressed the opinion that it 
was his wish that Pius IX should stay on in the precinct of the Vati-
23 
can as long as possible until better times had come. 
23 Rapp 1728, March 31, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 9, 
fols. 98-100. 
Comte d'Harcourt had served earlier in French diplomatic 
posts in the German states under the July Monarchy and the Second 
Republic. He resigned his post at Stuttgart after the Coup of 
December 2, 1851, and remained in private life until the 1871 ap-
pointment to Rome. His father, Francois-Eugene-Gabrielg due 
d'Harcourt (1786-65) had been French ambassador to Rome during 
the troubles there in 1849-51. The Harcourt family archives 
were destroyed by fire in 1944. The Due de Corcelles had pre-
viously been a member of the Corps Legistatif in the Second Em -
pire. The appointment to Italy was his first diplomatic post. 
Later, he became' an active Republican. 
The concerted action proposal about which Chigi and Thiers 
talked, was one of many which came up during the months after 
September 20, 1870. These are all discussed in their entirety 
through the many pages of the prestigious work by S. William Hal-
perin, Italy and the Vatican at War: A Study of Their Relations 
from the Outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War to the Death of 
Pius IX (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1939). Halperin 1s 
is the premier guide for studying the European outlook on the 
Roman Question during these years. Unfortunately he makes only 
three references to Chigi. 
Halperin refers to disclaimers by Thie rs of participation in 
joint action with the other powers, disclaimers which were made 
prior to the March 30 conference with Chigi, pp. 188-90. 
The remark by Thiers about Pius IX staying on at the Vati-
can is the only reference found by all of Chigi's correspondence 
about Pius 1 being rumored to be leaving Rome or about France 
offering him a refuge. 
r 
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On the following day, March 31, Chigi held a conference with 
Jules Favre whom he had not seen since the negotiations with Bis-
marck in the previous September and October. Favre explained to 
Chigi that he had given Harcourt two general guidelines for the con-
duct of his mission to Rome. First he was to maintain an attitude 
of reserve on all that touched upon the question of the Temporal 
Power. Secondly, he was to be constantly alert that the person of 
the Holy Father was respected. The new ambassador to Italy had 
been instructed in the same manner, and Favre assured Chigi that 
Choiseul was the very man for that position. 
Chigi said he hoped that the French government would carry 
out its policy and that the government of Florence would not throw 
itself in the way. Chigi then asked Favre, as he had asked Thiers, 
what he thought of.the reported plans of Bavaria, Austria, and 
Prussia. Favre responded that the only thing he had heard along 
those lines was that those powers had discussed what they would do 
when the Italian government moved to Rome. Each seemed inclined 
to name one emissary to both Pius IX and Victor Emmanuel and that 
an ecclesiastic would be named as a sort of assistant ambassador 
who would handle strictly religious affairs. Favre said he under-
stood that Antonelli had already heard this proposal and had broadly 
r 
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. d. 24 
reJecte 1t. 
With the conclusion of this conference, a semblance of nor-
malcy appeared to have emerged. Chigi had presented his creden-
tials, regular contact with the foreign minister had been established, 
and the French government had been set up in a central capital. 
Things might have been normal for Flavio Chigi, and he might have 
been able to work unhindered toward his intended goal of getting the 
French to come to the papal rescue had not the storm of the Com -
mune then brewing in Paris presented another drastic interruption. 
·24 Rapp 1730, April 1, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165~ f 8, fols. 
63 -64. 
A large bulk of twenty-two volumes of Jules Favre 1s papers 
is stored in the AMAE, Papiers des Agents du MAE, Inventaire 
No. 55. The exchanges between Favre and Chigi concerning the 
evacuation of the diplomatic corps from Paris (discussed in Chap-
ter IV) are all that these twenty-two volumes yielded pertinent to 
this dissertation. 
Favre' s Rome et La R~publique Francaise (Paris, 1871), 
his personal testimony on Papal-Franco relations during the period 
and his disapproval of France rushing to the pope's aid, likewise 
contains virtually nothing regarding Chigi. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE COMMUNE AND THE FADING HOPE IN THE 
SUMMER OF 1871 
The disjointed state of political affairs in France to which 
Flavio Chigi had given such vexatious attention during his days in 
Tours and Bourdeaux attained its fiery climax with the outbreak of 
the Commune of Paris in March of 1871. All of Chigi's fears of 
diabolical revolutionaries and agitating socialists materialized when 
the National Guard of Paris raised its standard of opposition to the 
Versailles government. A whole new set of problems and troubles 
confronted the Apostolic Nuncio, all of which he could have done 
without. A government upon which Chigi and Rome depended for 
aid in the long run was now severely threatened from within and 
would be distracted for an indefinite period while facing the Com-
mune. France had been battered enough by the. Prussians to suffer 
protracted internal discord. 
Within the city of Paris itself, the difficulties were enor-
mous. The Commune regime had proclaimed separation of Church 
and state, freedom of education, equality of man, and other dan-
gerous doctrines. The regime was closing churches and convents 
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and was arresting priests. Chief among these was the archbishop, 
Georges Darboy (1813-1871). The situation of being an outside 
witness might have been Chigi's fate during the days of the Commune. 
The normal expectation would have been for him to send a narration 
of events to Rome and a description of the efforts of the Versailles 
government against the Commune. Such a mere stand-by role was 
to be denied Chigi as he expended strenuous energy to secure Arch-
bishop Darboy's release. 
Darboy had remained in Paris throughout the entire siege 
and had won much acclaim for his efforts on behalf of the plight of 
the citizens. This esteem was not enough to prevent his arrest by 
the Commune government. Chigi was first informed of the arrest 
while on a stop at Poitiers on the journey from Bourdeaux to Ver-
sailles. After a!"riving in Versailles, Chigi tried fervently to 
grasp the situation and ascertain the conditions under which Darboy 
' 
was being detained. Despite ·versailles being only twenty miles 
from the city of Paris proper, communication was virtually impos-
sible given the siege of the city now being maintained by the troops 
of the Versailles government. 
The hands-tied dilemma was changed when, in early April, 
the Vicar-General of Paris, Abb~ Lagarde, arrived in Versailles 
bearing news and messages from Darboy. Lagarde explained to 
Chigi some of Darboy's motivation in submitting to arrest, namely 
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that Darboy and the other clerics imprisoned did not see fit to aban-
don their posts in the face of the new enemy. Their love for the 
l 
Church had prompted them to resist. 
Lagarde had come to Versailles for reasons other than to 
pay a courtesy call on the papal nuncio. He was the intermediary 
in the scheme of proposing to Thie rs an exchange of prisoners held 
by the Versailles government (notably Louis Blanqui) for Darboy 
and other prominent hostages being held by the Commune. Lagarde 
informed Chigi of this mission, and Chigi took a hand in the matter 
by making his own appeal to Thie rs several days later. In this 
interview, Thiers attempted to brush off Chigi's pleas by explaining 
as much as he admired the hostages and sympathized with their 
plight, he could in no way have any dealings of this nature with the 
insurrectionists. , Undaunted, Chigi tried to point out the risk to 
the life of the prisoners because of the character of their captors 
and the possibility of an attack by the Parisian populace. Thie rs 
countered by saying that the situation in the city was one of public 
calm, and one did not have to fear a mob attack. Nonetheless, 
2 
Thiers said he would discuss the matter with his cabinet. 
l Rapp 1736, n. d., ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 165, f 8, 
fols. 81-82. 
2
rbid. , fols. 82-84. 
r 
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Chigi was not to be put off by Thie rs' rebuff but decided to 
push on and call on other persons who might be able to help Darboy. 
Accordingly, Chigi established contact with the American minister, 
Washburne, who had helped Chigi so much the previous autumn dur-
ing the negotiations with Bismarck. During the intervening months, 
Washburne had conducted himself admirably by acting as liaison 
between the Prussians and the French. Washburne had likewise 
endeared himself to the citizens of Paris because he had stayed on 
in the city throughout the siege. Perhaps Washburne's influence 
with all parties --the Versailles group, the Communards, and the 
Prussians who were never very far away at any time--would enable 
him to be of some help. 
On April 22, Washburne arrived in Versailles and called 
on Chigi. Washburne expressed his outrage that Archbishop Dar-
boy had been confined, saying that he fully sympathized with Chigi's 
feeling and how Darboy's arrest had caused a stir throughout the 
Catholic world. Washburne pledge that he would do everything in 
his power to secure Darboy 1s release, though his action would be 
entirely unofficial and would be restricted by the neutral policy of 
his home government. The American minister then gave Chigi a 
report on Darboy's condition which Chigi forwarded to Rome. For 
the next several weeks, Washburne worked feverishly for Darboy's 
freedom. He made a number of visits to Darboy in his cell at the 
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LaRoquette prison, being one of the few persons allowed to do so. 
Washburne made a number of direct overtures to Darboy's captor, 
3 General Cluseret, all of which efforts were to prove futile. 
The direct and indirect entreaties to Thie rs were proving 
fruitless. Chigi's efforts to use Washburne 1s connections like-
wise were meeting without success, although Washburne displayed 
much greater cooperation. As the troops of the Versailles gov-
ernment were moving in on the city, Chigi explored one more 
method that might lead to Darboy's release. On May 19 Chigi 
sought the aid of the Prussians. He went, on the suggestion of 
Lord Lyons, to the Prince of Saxony, who was the commandant of 
the Prussian occupation forces headquartered at Soisy-sous -
Montmorency. Chigi was told by General Fabrice, the Prince's 
adjutant, that both the Prince and the general himself had been 
negotiating for some time with the leaders of the Commune, in 
' 
particular with Cluseret, for the release of the prominent hostages. 
Fabrice said that the Prussian efforts had been undertaken by the 
direct orders of Bismarck. Nonetheless, the .Prussians were 
3Rapp (no number), April 26, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 
85-86, and Washburne, Recollections, II, p. 166. Chigi and 
Washburne met face to face only on this one occasion and main-
tained little correspondence during Commune. 
4 
making no headway either. 
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Five days later, on May 24, Archbishop Darboy was shot at 
La Roquette along with several others. The act was among the 
last carried out by the Commune which was suffering its own death 
in those very hours. In the next several days, Chigi interviewed 
various witnesses of the shooting or persons who had seen Darboy 
in his last days. Several gave rather impressive reports on the 
Archbishop's strength and firmness, and Chigi was able to write to 
Rome that Darboy had "gone towards death with calm and courage. 115 
In early June, Chigi returned to Paris for the first time in 
eight months. Of major concern to him was the condition of Church 
properties in the city, which he found to be not too severe. In a 
cer'ta in sense he took interim control of the affairs of the archdio-
cese of Paris by holding meetings with the metropolitan chapter, 
visiting damaged churches, distributing a papal relief donation of 
50, 000 francs, and making moves to choose Darboy 1s successor. 
On June 7, Chigi presided at the solemn funeral service in Notre 
Dame at which he gave the absolution. The funeral was held on a 
4Rapp 1747, May 24, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 242, f 2, fols. 
173-174; Joseph-Alfred Card. Foulon, Histoire de la Vie et des 
Oeurves de Mgr. Darboy (Paris, 1889), pp. 555-567; and Lord 
Newton, Lord Lyons, I, p. 387. 
5 Rapp 1748, May 29, 1871, ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 165, 
f 8, fols. 93-94. 
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grand scale at public expense to show that the Commune had been 
completely overcome. Chigi thought that the huge multitude which 
turned out indicated that the sentiments of the Parisians was defin-
6 
itely in favor of the Church rather than the Commune. 
The troubles in Paris, while causing Chigi much anguish 
and sleepless nights, did not keep him completely distracted from 
his major duty, obtaining help for the Holy See and keeping alive in 
the mind of the French government the plight of the imprisoned 
Pius IX. Even through the days of the Commune, Chigi found time 
to devote himself to this most sacred part of his mission. As the 
violence and disruption continued at Paris, the nuncio found him -
self pursuing some old familiar paths and utilizing new approaches 
as .incidents and movements within French politics presented much 
hope. 
On April 8, 1871, Chigi held another conference with Favre. 
The Foreign Minister was quite eager to know if indeed Pius IX was 
under lock and key in the Vatican and was not allowed to leave. 
Chigi assured him that the pope was indeed a prisoner and took 
6Rapp 1750, June 6, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 115~117 and 
Rapp 1752, June 8, 1871, loc. ci.t., fols. 103-105; Foulon, pp. 
566-567; and Washburne, II, pp. 185-186. 
In his L'Eglise de Paris sous la Commune, Pers~cution et 
Martyrs (Paris, 1871), Alfred Rastoul makes no mention that any 
damage was done by the Communards to the Nunciature building. 
The same is true of other books on the Commune. 
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heart that Favre was slowly becoming convinced of the difficulty 
facing the Holy Father. Going on from this point, Chigi said that 
the Holy Father's position was intolerable and that the Powers and 
especially France could no longer stand idly by and thus by their 
silence be a party t.o the reprobate action of the government of 
Florence. Chigi repeated he was fully aware of the miserable cir-
cumstances facing France but that surely, it seemed to him, France 
in concert with the other Powers could offer moderate yet definitive 
remonstrances to the government of Florence on such things as the 
Italian plan to transfer the capital to Rome and the continuing seiz -
ure of religious buildings in Rome by the invaders. 
Favre said he did not see the international importance of 
the Italian government expropriating four or five convents. Chigi 
reiterated that such actions should be of concern to the Powers 
because they were theft from the Holy Father. Favre asked how 
I 
Chigi thought the Powers could stop the transfer of the capital. 
Chigi admitted the difficulty of actually stopping the Italians, but, 
he said, this should not hinder any concerted appeals. Favre 
ended the discussion by asserting his earlier premise that any 
concerted action could not be attempted by the Powers without a 
previous consultation with the Holy Father. Although Favre did 
not explicitly say so, he evidently felt that such an arrangement 
was the only feasible one, and he was chastising Pius IX indirectly 
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7 
or emp oytng t e tact o constant con emnahon an tntranstgence. 
If Favre was proving to be as stubborn and unsympathetic as 
ever about the Roman Question, other elements in the French gov-
ernment were stirring up their enthusiasm about helping the pope. 
Plans were afoot in the Monarchist Assembly by early April of 1871 
for an interpellation of the government on its views. Chigi was 
ecstatic over these developments, and he wrote to Rome on April 12 
that the deputies were pursuing a very practical means of action. 
The plan, as he understood it, was for the Assembly to make a 
. 
declaration of its belief of the necessity of the Temporal Sovereignty 
of the Holy Father in order for him to have liberty and independence 
for the exercise of his apostolic ministry. Then the Assembly 
would call upon the new government to take part with other states to 
restore the rights, of the Holy See. 8 
Another bright ray of hope appeared on the horizon when the 
French episcopate began sending petitions to the Assembly demand-
ing action on the part of the French government. On May 3, Chigi 
received Cardinal Henri Bonnechose, Archbishop of Rouen, as a 
guest at Versailles. In this rare conference with a member of the 
7 
Rapp 1733, April 8, 1871, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 68-69. 
8Rapp 1735, April 12, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 78-79 and Rapp 
1744, May 31, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 113-114. 
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French hierarchy, Chigi found out many details of how a collective 
address from the bishops would be made to the Assembly, that a 
circular was to be sent to all French bishops, and how he (Cardi-
nal Bonnechose) was leading the movement. It was hoped that the 
petitions of the bishops would be accompanied by demonstrations 
and other expressions of sentiment on the part of the laity. 9 
Finally, the most brilliant champion of all Catholic and 
papal causes came on the sce)'fe in the person of the Comte de Cham-
bord (1820-1883). On May 8, 1871, Chambord issued one of his 
famous letters, this one going to Joseph de Carayon-Latour, a 
Legitimatist leader in the Assembly. Chambord spoke very heav-
ily of his religious feelings, making reference to such feelings as 
"I 9nly bring back peace, religion, and concord," and "If France 
is to be saved, God must reign there as master and then I can reign 
as king. " The phrases which struck home for the French clericals, 
for Chigi, and for Rome were: "The freedom of the Church is the 
prime condition of peace of spirit and order in the world. To pro-
tect the Holy See was ever the honor of our country and the most 
incontestible cause of its grandeur among nations. Only in periods 
of the greatest misfortune has France abandoned this glorious pat-
9Rapp 1742, May 3, 1871, ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 242, 
f 2, fols. 159-160. 
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ronage.'' 10 
Laying bare his feelings, Chigi described this letter as "one 
of the most important political events for France." The appeal, 
replete with its rejection of strife and violence, has been received 
with universal favor by the French people and had won the admira-
tion of Chambord's adversaries everywhere. Already the Orlean-
ists were ready to rally around Chambord's leadership. Despite 
Chigi's obvious and overwhelming partiality towards the Legitimat-
ist cause and his overestimation of the success of Chambord's let-
ter, he did not in any way specifically indicate how he felt what 
Chambord 1s coming to the throne would affect the Roman Question. 11 
As the summer of 1871 opened, the state of affairs in the 
Roman Question had taken several critical turns. Victor Emma-
nuel had already made one visit to Rome. The Italian parliament 
had debated long and hard and had after great difficulty passed the 
' 
Law of Guarantees on May 13. The Italian government had taken 
control of a number of public buildings in Rome for housing minis -
lOHalperin, pp. 198-199 and Marvin L. Brown, The Comte 
de Chambord: the Third Republic's Uncompromising King (Dur-
ham, 1967), pp. 86-87. 
11 Rapp 1754, May 17, 1871, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 169-172. 
In early July of 1871, Chambord made a brief, incognito visit to 
Paris, but there is no indication in Chigi's reports or in Brown, 
pp. 89-90, that the nuncio met with the Pretender. 
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tries, buildings which had previously been papal property. These 
takeovers had been regarded as theft and sacrilege by the Vatican, 
and official protests were issued on each occasion. As has been 
seen, Chigi had often brought up these protests in conversations 
with Favre. The last step remaining was for the Italian government 
to officially move from Florence to Rome. 
set for July 1, 1871. 
The date for this was 
An important aspect of the transfer would be whether the 
diplomatic corps in Florence would accompany the government, thus 
signalling international sanction of the seizure of Rome. The Holy 
See would of course rather not see this happen, though there was 
little it was able to do to prevent it. Nonetheless, Chigi would talk 
to Favre about having the French ambassador Choiseul either stay 
behind in Florence or come home in protest. The transfer of the 
Italia:q capital would coincide with some of the debates in the French 
Assembly on the Roman Question and the discussion of France's 
form of government. The monarchists and other conservatives 
were beginning to flex their muscles vis -a-vis Thie rs on these mat-
ters, and it was clear that a showdown was pending. 
On June 21, Chigi held what was to prove to be his last con-
ference with Favre. The main topic of conversation was the im-
pending Italian move to Rome. Favre indicated that the official 
notice had been communicated to the Florence diplomatic corps and 
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that the date had been announced. Choiseul had already telegraphed 
to Versailles asking for instructions. Favre said in a subdued 
manner that no decision had been taken and that he was waiting for 
further developments. France was interested in what the other 
Powers were thinking, and Favre was going to consult with the Aus-
trian ambassador Metternich shortly. 
Chigi forcefully emphasized that the French ambassador in 
Florence should not follow the government to Rome. Whatever 
the other Powers would do should not impede France in her deci-
sion. France must do what it could to head off the scandal of tacit 
approval of the invasion of Rome which would be the result in the 
eyes of Europe of the presence in Rome of the diplomatic corps ac-
credited to Victor Emmanuel. 
Favre thought that one of two things might happen: one, 
that the Foreign Ministry might be going by itself to Rome without 
' 
the King, the other that Victor Emmanuel and his entire govern-
ment were going to permanently move. If it were a case of only 
the Italian Foreign Ministry making the change,. no problems would 
emerge if Choiseul did not accompany it. But if the second even-
tuality proved to be true, which was more likely, then the gravest 
difficulties would arise, and Favre wanted utmost to avoid ruptur-
ing relations with Italy. Chigi ended the discussion by repeating 
that even in this case he still saw no reason for the French am bas -
r 
12 
sador to go to Rome. 
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On June 27, Chigi gained an audience with Thie rs to try his 
luck with the Chief Executive. On being questioned as to whether 
Choiseul would be instructed to go to Rome, Thiers indicated that 
he had been in contact with the cabinets of Austria and Prussia and 
that they were inclined to instruct their representatives to move 
with the Italian government. While France had indeed considered 
telling Choiseul to remain behind, she found it very tedious to fol-
low such a course as so doing would put France in complete isola-
13 
tion from the other European states. 
As the appointed day for the transfer of the capital to Rome 
approached, Chigi grew more desperate. Uncertainty existed in 
diplomatic circles as 'to how many of its bureaucratic offices the 
Italian government would move to Rome or whether Victor Emma -
nuel ~ould simply make a symbolic, ceremonial entrance into the 
city. Undaunted, Chigi made an eleventh-hour appeal to Favre on 
June 30 by sending a strongly worded note (the two men did not 
meet personally} that Choiseul not be permitted to go to Rome. 
12 Rapp 1755, June 21, 1871, ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 
165, f 8, fols. 120-123. According to Halperin, pp. 150-152, Favre 
was hoping that the Italians would merely make Rome an "honorary 
capital." In this Rapp 1755, Chigi further quotes Favre as hinting 
that he did not think the transfer would take place. 
13 Rapp 1756, June 27, 1871, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 125-128. 
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Chigi pointed out once again how the presence of the French am bas -
sador in Rome would be a French sanction of the Italian invasion 
and that such a move would mean an abandonment of France 1s tradi-
tional policy toward the Holy See. If Choiseul was actually to 
make the trip to Rome along with Victor Emmanuel, then the Ver-
sailles government should issue a declaration that this action im-
14 
plied little or no significance. 
Favre sent a speedy reply the next day. He said that he 
had shown Chigi 's letter to Thie rs but that Thie rs insisted that 
France must still maintain its good relations with the Kingdom of 
Italy and that a line of conduct would be followed which would be for 
the benefit of all. Choiseul had been given permission to return to 
France in order to take part in the Assembly where he still held a 
seat. Choiseul was to retain his position as ambassador but would 
not have to face up to the task of accompanying Victor Emmanuel to 
Rome. Instead, the French charge d'affaires was to go to Rome no 
earlier than July 5, pay his respects, and then return immediately 
15 
to Florence until the situation had improved. 
This is approximately what occurred. Most of the officials 
14Rapp 17_, July 2, 1871, ASV, Segr di St, R 165, f 9, 
fols. 106-109. 
15Favre to Chigi, July 1, 1871, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 110-111. 
r 
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of the Italian government arrived in Rome on July 1 when the offi-
cial proclamation of Rome as the capital of Italy was made. Victor 
Emmanuel entered the next day and took possession of the Quirinale 
as his residence. Across the city, at the Vatican, an uneasy quiet 
prevailed, but no stern condemnations were issued. Late appeals 
to Piux IX to leave the city in protest were ignored. A conspicu-
ous part of the scene was the absence not only of Choiseul, but also 
of the Austrian, Belgian, and Prussian ministers to Italy, all of 
whose governments had instructed them to stay away for the time 
being so as to retain some gesture of respect for the claims of 
. IX f . 16 Pius o sovereignty over Rome. 
Despite the deference shown by the Versailles government 
in instructing Choiseul to stay away from Rome for a while, Chigi 
had found that Favre was in fact as unhelpful as ever and Thiers 
continued to be even more adamant in his refusal to take up the 
papal cause. There remained one more arena where hope still 
flickered--the Assembly where the long-awaited debates and inter-
pellations on the Roman Question were about to take place. The 
petitions of the bishops were flowing in daily to Versailles. Simi-
lar declarations from Catholic lay groups were also pouring in. 
Distinguished politicians of some of France 1s oldest and most 
16Halperin, pp. 163-165. 
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Catholic families were organizing their forces. 
Although Chigi made a number of quick trips to Versailles 
to be close to the scene and met occasionally with some of the con-
servative leaders, he seems to have re·mained in the background, 
keeping in mind his position as a diplomat and undoubtedly remem-
bering the slaps on the wrist he had suffered earlier from Napoleon 
III when he had intervened in French domestic affairs. Chigi re-
ported, for example, what such persons as Joinville, the due 
d 'Aumale, Kolb, Pojot, Cardinal Bonnechose, and Bishop Dupan-
loup were doing and how they were working with one another. But 
such reports were done evidently only as a part of Chigi 1s function 
as the pope's chief observer. Chigi 1s dispatches, the biographies 
of some of these individuals, and the histories of this phase of 
French politics indicate that no active role was taken by the nun-
17 
cio. 
By July of 1871, the two separate movements were now 
fusing into one: the petitions of the bishops and laity and the activ-
ity of the conservative deputies. The deputies -0.ecided to use the 
petitions as a base for their debates and move for a vote that these 
petitions be handed over to the Foreign Ministry for action. As 
17Rapp 17_, July 2, 1871, loc. cit. and Rapp 1763, July 
19, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 8, fols. 133-135. 
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the entire matter was technically an internal political affair for the 
moment, Favre as Foreign Minister was not directly involved. He 
seems to have faded from the picture as far as Chigi is concerned 
since he did not see Favre during the interpellation proceedings. 
The central figure, it was quite clear to Chigi, was still Adolphe 
Thie rs. 
On July 2, secondary elections were held for about one hun-
dred members of the Assembly. The republican elements gained 
significantly much to the joy of Thiers who still mistrusted both 
the Bourbons and the Orleanists. Chigi's opinion of the outcome 
was that although the Thie rs forces were quite satisfied, the mon-
archists were by no means desolated. Chigi felt that the augmen-
tation of the republican party in the Assembly would not present any 
. b 1 . th f h . . 11 . 18 serious o stac e ln e course o t e upcom1ng 1nterpe atlon. 
Thiers remained the man of the hour. On July 9, Chigi 
wrote to Rome that the Chief of the Executive power was refraining 
for the moment from any decisive act which would indicate that he 
favored the Temporal Sovereignty or from taking any action which 
would compromise the relations between France and the govern-
ment of Victor Emmanuel. Thie rs wanted to stay away from any 
declaration of the necessity of the Temporal Power. Peace with 
18 Rapp 17_, July 2, 1871, loc. cit. 
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Italy was uppermost in his mind. Above all, Thiers did not want 
a pronouncement from the Assembly which would commit France 
to action. Chigi 's overall opinion was that Thie rs was essentially 
recognizing the powerlessness of France, but that to look beyond 
Thie rs 1 "veil of ambition, 11 one could still see that in his heart 
Thiers still favored the rights and privileges of the Church. 
19 
The culminating debate on the Roman Question took place 
in the Assembly on July 22, 1871. Thiers rendered a long and 
famous speech in which he reiterated his personal devotion to the 
Holy Father and his essential belief in the necessity of the inde-
pendence of the Holy See but rejected any action by France because 
of her own weakness and because of the international scene which 
called for peace and not war. Italy was a respected member of 
the European com·munity with many friends (particularly the new 
Germc:i-n Empire), and France did not wish to upset the present 
equilibrium. If the pope were ever threatened, France would pro-
tect his person or always offer him a place of refuge. An expedi-
tion to Rome was out of the question. 
After the speech, the Assembly went through prolonged 
debate and finally voted an order of the day (not a statute or offi-
cial act of government) which assigned the episcopal petitions to 
l9Rapp 1759, July 9, ASV, loc. cit., 101-103. 
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the Foreign Office for study and consultation. The Assembly in 
effect showed how it felt emotionally but had delivered the matter 
.into the manifestly unwilling hands of Jules Favre. 20 
Despite all the drama that seemed to be building up and all 
the hopes of the clericals, the outcome was a languid statement and 
a technical evasion. It now seemed that everyone i.n France (ex-
cept perhaps for Chambord): Thiers, Favre, the conservatives 
and monarchists, the cardinals and bishops in the Assembly, were 
all singing the same chorus --Holy Mother the Church had been 
raped, the independence of the Holy Father was necessary for the 
functioning of his office, Pi.we IX was a prisoner, but there is noth-
ing we can do about it. 
Chigi was under no illusion about the hollow victory that had 
been achieved in the Assembly vote. Writing to Rome four days 
later, he described the outcome as being insignificant when com-
,. 
pared to the sufferings and indignities endured by the Holy Father. 
Chigi. expressed his disappointment at the vote even though what had 
happened was entirely expected. Chigi realized how the Roman 
Question was intricately involved with the multi-faceted political 
structure of France and the changing international scene: a strong-
er Italy, a weak France, the new Germany, and so on. The anti-
20Halperin, pp. 213-214. 
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papal press in France had declared that the July 22 vote was the 
last that shall be seen or heard from the French government re-
garding the Roman Question, but Chigi discounted such statements 
as attempts to mislead public opinion. The major result of the 
vote was that the majority of the Assembly had not given up their 
support of the Holy See but had deferred the question for the time 
being. They had not excluded decisive action but had merely 
postponed it. 
Now that the petitions had been sent to the Quai d'Orsay, 
the door was still left open for another interpellation despite the 
fact that the Foreign Minister's principles were contrary to the 
idea of the Temporal Power. When the next interpellation could 
arise, Chigi felt, depended on how long Favre remained in office 
and how well the majority held together. Since Favre had voted 
against the proposal, demands were being raised for his resigna-
tion. 
More than Favre, Chigi understood that Thiers was still 
the great hindrance. Chigi repeated how so much of Thie r's 
speech had referred to the relationship between the Roman Question 
and the general European situation. It was impossible to alter 
present conditions to the point where the Roman Question might be 
fortuitously brought up again. Chigi simply hoped that "an irre-
sistable germ might remain alive in his [Thie rs 1] breast'' to some 
21 
day go ahead with his conviction. 
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Favre resigned soon after the vote because of his total dis-
approval of France taking any steps whatever towards active sup-
port of Pius IX's claims. He was succeeded by Claude Remusat 
(1797-1875), an old friend of Thiers and a life-long republican. 
Remusat was to prove to be as courteous yet as evasive as Favre 
or most other French officials. The petitions which had gone to 
the Foreign Ministry were buried there not to surface again. The 
affirmation of Thiers as President of the Republic at the end of 
August, 1871, and the continued drift towards the entrenchment of 
the Third Republic in later years insured that the Eldest Daughter 
of the Church was not going to rescue the Supreme Pontiff from 4is 
prison cell. 
Thus, by ttie end of the summer of 1871, Archbishop Flavio 
Chigi had lived through a harrowing eighteen months of political 
•. 
intrigue, international crises, the death of an empire, and the col-
lapse of the 1000-year-old Temporal Power. He had dealt with 
three mercurial and difficult heads of state: Napoleon III, Trochu, 
21 Rapp 1764, July26, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f8, 
fols. 146-148. Halperin indicates that even Antonelli was not 
carried away by the vote of July 22. Antonelli told the Austrian 
ambassador to the Holy See, "In the present situation of France, 
if I had to speak before a French chamber, I would have spoken no 
differently." Pp. 218-219. 
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and Thie rs. He had worked with six different foreign ministers, 
none of which had brought him much satisfaction. Chigi had endured 
eight months of exile in dreary provincial cities. The city of his 
birth and of his Holy Father was in the hands of an excommunicated 
despoiler, while the Paris to which he had so long been assigned 
was ravaged by siege, bombardment, and Commune. It is little 
wonder that by July of 1871, Chigi spoke of controlling within him-
self "un sentimento di profonda tristezza. 1122 
22
Rapp, 1764, July 26, 1871, loc. cit., fol. 146v. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The tenure of Archbishop Flabio Chigi as Apostolic Nuncio 
to Paris lasted approximately three years after 1871. This period 
proved far less momentous than the first nine years. Whereas the 
Sixties had been replete with a continuous round of international 
crises, Napoleonic intrigues, and embarrassing faux pas by the 
nuncio; and whereas 1870 and 1871 represented an unending series 
of failure, disappointment, exile, and frustration, the time from 
the, Assembly vote in July of 1871 and Chigi's departure from France 
in May of 1874 wa.s virtually laggard. France was internally peace -
ful, the Republic gained strength, the international scene was dor-
mant, and the Roman Question garnered so little interest as to 
become a dead letter. 
Chigi 's influence in diplomatic circles in Paris and his ap-
pe rances at the Quai d'Orsay diminished significantly. Before the 
dawn of the Third Republic, Chigi had very ready access to both 
sovereigns and foreign ministers. Hardly a month went by without 
an appointment with a foreign minister. During the months of the 
Franco-Prussian War and the Government of National Defense, his 
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meetings with Caudordy, Favre, and Thiers were regular and fre -
quent. 
From the summer of 1871 on, Chigi was far less welcome 
in government offices than he had been before. Throughout all of 
1872, Chigi had one meeting with Thiers and only three with the 
foreign minister, mostly to discuss the plight of persecuted Arme -
nian Catholics in the Turkish Empire. The same held true for 
1873. Chigi had one conference with Thiers before the President's 
resignation in May of that year, and he had the opportunity to meet 
with Thiers 1 successor, Marshall MacMahon, only to present his 
credentials to the new Chief of State. 
1 
ments with foreign ministers. 
There were but two appoint-
In one important area, Chigi did make a crucial contribu-
tion by bringing a"bout a subtle change in the nomination procedure 
of bishops. The portfolio of the Minister of Cults was held by the 
' 
notorious anti-clerical Jules Simon. During the 1870's a remark-
able number of staunchly pro-papal and conservative candidates 
for French sees were approved by the Republican government. 
Chigi had a direct hand in this as he was the one who proposed the 
names to Simon who seemed all too eager to grant approvals. 
1ASV, Segr di St, Rubricelle, #351 (1871), #358 (1872), 
#365 (1873), and #372 (1874). 
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Chigi seized the initiative as early as March of 1871 when in an 
early audience with Thiers, Chigi found the Chief Executive some-
what disinterested in the business of naming bishops. Chigi later 
had little difficulty in securing the nomination of Archbishop Gus -
tave Guibert of Tours as Archbishop of Paris shortly after Dar-
boy's death. Thereafter, government confirmation of episcopal 
candidates was virtually automatic. The episode led to Bishop 
Dupanloup 1s famous remark that Simon would get a Red Hat sooner 
2 than he would. 
On December 22, 1873, Flavio Chigi was among those 
named cardinal in the first consistory announced by Pius IX after 
2Rapp 1721, ASV, Segr di St, March 10, 1871, ASV, Segr 
di St, A 1871, R 165, f 9, fols. 84-87. 
Jacques Gadille, in his La Pens~e et l 'action politique des 
eveques Francais au d~but de la Ille R~publique, I, pp. 286-288, 
explor'es more fully this aspect of Chigi's accomplishment. 
Gadille also tells how a number of French prelates were elated to 
see Chigi leave as then their own influence in naming bishops 
would rise, I, pp. 19 and 293. 
Some of Simon 1s correspondence on this matter is found in 
AMAE, M~moires et Documents, Rome, Vol. 117, fols. 218-307 
in which he complains that Chigi was making a "pr~sentation" or 
a "nomination" (Simon's original French words, thus the italici-
zation.) 
The author consulted the following works by Simon which 
contained nothing about Chigi: Le Gouvernement de M. Thiers 
(2 vols., Paris, 1878); Souvenirs du 4 Septembre; Le Gouvern-
ment de la D~fense Nationale (Paris, 1876); and Souvenirs du 4 
Septembre, Origine et chute de l 1Empire (Paris, 1874). Per-
mission could not be secured to use the file of Simon's private 
papers at the Archives Nationales. 
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the loss of the Temporal Power. Others included in the group of 
new cardinals were Guibert and Archbishop Regnier of Lille, who 
were the first French cardinals elevated in over a decade. In 
view of Chigi's troublesome conduct under the Second Empire, his 
ineffectiveness during 1870 and 1871, and his falling-out with the 
Republic, it would hardly seem that he was a worthy candidate for 
being a Prince of the Church. An inescapable precedent was being 
followed in elevating him to the purple, for the standing order was 
well set that papal nuncios to certain important Catholic states such 
as France, Austria, and Spain were automatically created cardinal 
upon the completion of their appointments as nuncios. This prac -
tise, followed to the present time, is deemed as the Holy See's 
way of honoring the state to which the nuncio had been accredited. 3 
Upon being- named cardinal, Chigi assumed the title of Pro-
nuncio until the arrival of his successor. Chigi received his Red 
Hat directly from President MacMahon in the chapel of the Palace 
of Versailles. That the head of the French state conferred a 
cardinal's insignia on a departing nuncio was another tradition 
which was scrupulously followed. Chigi stayed on at Paris until 
3Most of this biographical information is obtained from 
the Chigi obituary in La Civiltl Cattolica, February 23, 1885, 
Vol. IX della serie duodecima (Vol. 141 in total series), pp. 
613-614. 
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May of 1874 when his replacement, Archbishop Meglia, reached 
the city to commence his duties. Meglia was a notorious ultra-
montane who had once been Pius IX's nuncio to Maximilian of 
Mexico where he offered little comfort and support to that ill-fated 
4 
monarch. 
Cardinal Chigi spent the rest of his days at Rome, falling 
victim to an old Vatican cliche: Promoveatur ut amoveatur, that 
is, "Let him be promoted that he may be removed." He served 
on a number of councils of congregations of the Holy See, but these 
functions were largely honorific. His fate was that of many a 
lonely cardinal in Rome: many titles but no power. Thus he held 
such grant sounding posts as Grand Prior of the Knights of Malta 
and Jerusalem, Archpriest of St. John Lateran Basilica, Secretary 
of Apostolic Briefs, and Cardinal-Protector of the St. Vincent de 
5 
Paul Society • 
. 
In the 1878 consistory which elected Leo XIII, Chigi was not 
considered a serious candidate for the papal throne. In the French 
Foreign Ministry Archives, there is a collection of dossiers on 
4
Ibid., and ASV, Segr di St, Rubricella #372 (1874). De-
tails on Meglia 's mission in Mexico can be found in Joan Haslip, 
The Crown of Mexico; Maximilian and His Empress Carlota (New 
York, 1971). 
5La Civilt'a Cattolica, loc. cit. 
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cardinals at the time of the conclave, a series put together to in-
form the Qua i d 'Orsay of the prospects to be faced as to the kind 
of pope any cardinal would make. In the report on Chigi, he is 
described as "a man of the world, a man of little talent and 
mediocre elevation of ideas, ••. and a fanatic infallibist." The 
report concluded that Chigi's only hope of becoming pope was the 
reputation of his family name and the fact that there had previously 
6 
been a Chigi pope, Alexander VII. 
On February 16, 1885, Flavia Cardinal Chigi died after a 
long illness at the age of 74. At the time of his death, he was the 
last cardinal from the Roman nobility. He was buried in the Chigi 
family tomb in his titular church of Santa Maria del Popolo. 7 
So lengthy a span as Chigi 's twelve years in an important 
diplomatic post is' difficult to appraise briefly. There seems no 
doubt that, taken as a whole, Chigi was an incompetent ambassa-
dor. The repeated mistakes and interferences of the 1860 1s, the 
numerous conflicts with various French ministries, the arguments 
with members of the hierarchy, and the embarrassing episode of 
the public apology to the Emperor were all affairs which add up to 
6 
AMAE, Memoires et Documents, Rome, Vol. 109, fols. 
16-17 and 82. 
7 La Civilta Cattolica, loc. cit. 
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a very sorry record of accomplishment. That the Dean of the 
Diplomatic Corps should have behaved in a far more restrained 
demeanor hardly needs be stated. 
When the writings and biographies of the other members of 
the Diplomatic Corps present in Paris are considered (persons such 
as Lyons, Metternich, Nigra, even Washburne), very little is to be 
found in reference to the Apostolic Nuncio. Chigi 's prominence 
both social and political among his fellow ambassadors was virtu-
ally nil. This should not have been the case in view of such factors 
as: Chigi 1s position as Dean, France's being a Catholic state, the 
importance of Napoleon Ill's Roman policy, and the immense meas -
ure of public standing enjoyed by the Paris Diplomatic Corps during 
the· Second Empire. 
One of the ·more astonishing facts about Chigi was his lack 
of influence or contacts with the full-blooded clerical Empress 
' 
Bugenie. Here supposedly was an eminent champion of the Papal 
Cause. Here was the woman who allegedly said, "Better the 
Prussians on the Seine than the Italians on the Tiber. 11 Yet the 
chief representative of the Holy Father accredited to the Second 
Empire met the Empress only on the highest of ceremonial occa-
sions and in the most formal manner. The intimacy which grew 
up between Eug~nie and other members of the Diplomatic Corps, 
especially Metternich and his fashionable wife Pauline, was not to 
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be the case with the Nuncio. In the last troubled hours of the Second 
Empire, Eugenie was helped in her escape from the Tuileries by 
Metternich and Nigra. Chigi's whereabouts are patently unknown. 
Chigi was stringently negligent in not trying to establish better 
8 
liaison. 
As regards other important personages in the French gov-
ernment, Chigi 's ascendancy was equally low. No cabinet member 
or chamber deputy was his confidante. There were no important 
contacts at the Quai d'Orsay. All the foreign ministers he dealt 
with received him very politely yet usually managed to be impec -
cably evasive. Ambassadors are not supposed to have spies and 
friends working for them, but they always do. Here again, the 
Apostolic Nuncio was woefully lacking. 
In operating in such seclusion and isolation from the proper 
8The author made extensive searches into numerous bio-
graphies of Empress Eug·enie, memoirs of members of the court 
of Napoleon III, and descriptions of social life in Paris during 
the 1860's. Only one work yielded even a morsel: Harold Kurtz, 
The Empress Eugenie, 1826-1920 (Boston, 1964), pp. 173-174 
wherein Eugenie is quoted as stating some opinions about Mexican 
affairs to the nuncio. Kurtz does not footnote this quotation. 
See the bibliography for the other works on Eug~nie looked 
into by the author, too numerous to mention here. -
This judgment on Chigi 's lack of favor with Eugenie is 
also deduced from the primary sources consulted at the Vatican 
Archives and in Paris where the Empress is rarely mentioned. 
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circles in Paris, Chigi was usually mistaken in his rather super-
ficial reports to Rome on the state of French politics. New min-
isters were rated only in terms of the level of their Catholic piety 
and their devotion to the Temporal Power. Chigi did not indicate 
that he had any conviction that the Second Empire was on shaky 
grounds or that Napoleon III could not be trusted, nor did he advise 
Rome of these conditions. 
In the long run, the shortcomings of Flavio Chigi as a nun-
cio created his share of the blame for the failure of papal policies 
in September of 1870. While Chigi ( or anyone else) could not 
have prevented the loss of the Temporal Power, certainly he held 
a very flexible position in which to operate and in which to mollify 
circumstances with his official relations to both Paris and Rome. 
His associations in France were so minimal or negative by the time 
of the Italian invasion of the Papal States that he was useless • 
• 
After the double-debacle of Sedan and the 20th of September 
and through the months at Tours and Bourdeaux, Chigi made some-
thing of an about-face in his modus operandi. Hidden talents and 
capabilities emerged under stress as exemplified by the courage 
shown during the dilemma of the Diplomatic Corps in the face of 
the siege and the change to a more pragmatic stand concerning the 
Roman Question. Despite the trouble of following a government-
in-exile, Chigi kept apace of political changes. Chigi remained 
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considerably erroneous in some of his political judgment, such as 
his description of Trochu as politically astute and the consistent 
equation of republicans with re volutiona rie s. Ch igi is to be com -
mended for shifting tactics in these days from asking for an ex-
peditionary force to trying to coerce the French into using what 
diplomatic means were available to work against the Italians. 
When the forces of Thiers and Favre were back in command, 
Chigi met his match. True, he was alert at all the crucial mom-
ents: the naming of an ambassador to the Holy See, the transfer 
of the capital to Rome, and the Assembly vote, In each case, 
Chigi gave his all of pleading and cajoling, of begging and imploring. 
Both Thie rs and Favre were perpetually one step ahead of Chi.gi. on 
all.issues. They were both extremely shrewd (as Chigi himself 
confessed), and there can be little doubt that they knew full well in 
advance what kind of interview they would have with the nuncio. 
The Executive Chief and the Foreign Minister of the New 
Republic saw the true picture: France was defeated, the Prussians 
were still in occupation, no other European state acted in protest to 
the seizure of Rome, France needed peaceful relations with all its 
. 
neighbors including Italy, and the unsettled political storm of re -
publicans versus three camps of monarchists would not allow any 
foreign involvement. These overly obvious facts were continually 
presented to the nuncio, who rejected them all with relentless 
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repetition of his unyielding view of the necessity of the Temporal 
Power for the liberty and independence of the Holy Father. 
Herein was the crux of Chigi's problem. While the French 
could deal with facts and reality, Chigi 's only base was religious, 
quasi-theological, and definitely emotional. He could offer France 
no distinct advantage in trying to re-establish the Temporal Power 
nor could he offer any reprisals if the French did not cooperate. 
He could only stubbornly speak of the involability of the Temporal 
Power and of France's historic mission to protect the Holy See. 
The evidence is strong that Chigi was not conscious of the difference 
between the passionate nature of his stance and the actual conditions 
which governed French policy. This lack of perception molded so 
much of Chigi 1s conduct and was his own greatest deficiency which 
contributed to all his other failures • 
• 
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